Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 42215
date: 10/7/2005 3:13
refid: 05DUSHANBE1622
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001622
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2015
TAGS: MCAP, TI
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0062 05/GARM AND VICINITY (U)
CLASSIFIED BY: Jonathan Edwards, DATT, USDAO Dushanbe, DIA.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 947 0062 05.
COUNTRY: (U) TAJIKISTAN (TI)
IPSP: (U) IFC1130; IFC1583;
IFC1510; IFC1515; IFC1516; IFC2000;
IFC2400; IFC2630.
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0062 05/GARM AND VICINITY(U).
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
——————————————— ———
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
——————————————— ———
DOI: (U) 20050807
REQS: (U) DHCD111048; DHCD111054; DHCD111042; U-UDX-2410-003-05;
U-UDX-1130-040-04.
SOURCE: (C) //OTS
6-947-0035-05//A WESTERN CONTRACTOR WITH BOTH
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACCESS TO INFORMATION BASED ON OFFICIAL
TRIPS TO THE REGION. SOURCE IS
NOT ESTABLISHED BUT RO HAS KNOWN
SOURCE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. CONTEXT STATEMENT — SOURCE PROVIDED
INFORMATION TO RO IN AN INFORMAL SETTING.
SUMMARY: (C) GARM AND ITS
SURROUNDING AREA ARE RELATIVELY SAFE,
AND MOST POSITIONS OF POWER ARE HELD BY STRONG SUPPORTERS OF
PRESIDENT RAHMONOV. FOREIGNERS HAVE NOT BEEN TARGETED IN THE
AREA FOR FOUR YEARS.
TEXT: 1. (C) ACCORDING TO SOURCE, tHE GARM REGION HAS A STABLE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, WHERE FOREIGNERS HAVE NOT BEEN TARGETED IN
FOUR YEARS. SOURCE DID MENTION
ONE DEMONSTRATION LAST AUGUST,
WHERE A POLICE STATION WAS STORMED, BUT SUGGESTED THIS WAS NOT
THE NORM. SOURCE CONFIRMED A
STRONG FOREIGN NGO PRESENCE IN
GARM.
2. (C) ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE GARM REGION, DESPITE HAVING BEEN
A STRONGHOLD OF THE TAJIK OPPOSITION DURING THE CIVIL WAR, HAS
VERY FEW UTO (UNITED TAJIK OPPOSITION) LEADERS LEFT IN POSITIONS
OF INFLUENCE IN THE VALLEY. IN
GARM ITSELF, THE MAYOR IS A
HARD-LINE SUPPORTER OF PRESIDENT RAHMONOV. TAVILDARA’S CIVILIAN
LEADERSHIP ALSO SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH A YOUNGER
BROTHER OF MINISTER OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS MIRZOEV (A FORMER
UTO COMMANDER BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE PEACE
ACCORDS) IS THE HEAD OF A SMALL VILLAGE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF
TAVILDARA.
3. (C) According to source the
leader of Jirgatal (NE of Garm)
is Shah Iskandarov, who controls the drug trade in the area.
The Sheikh, an ally of Iskandarov(the arrested one) was a power
in Garm, but has now fled the country, according to Source
(Field note: there is a person known as the sheikh, who was
recently convicted on armed insurrection charges by a tajik
court. End note).
4. (C) ACCORDING TO SOURCE IN GARM THERE IS A MILITARY UNIT MADE
UP OF FORMER LOW-LEVEL UTO COMBATANTS.
5. (C) ACCORDING TO SOURCE THERE IS AN MOD BASE IN TAVILDARA.
6. (U) ACCORDING TO SOURCE TRAVEL FROM DUSHANBE TO GARM IN
SUMMER IS FOUR HOURS, BUT 12 HOURS IN WINTER. From Garm to
Jirgatal, 2 hours, then 1 hour to Jayilgan, then 1 hour to
border. In winter another 12
hours just to Jirgatal.
COMMENTS: 1. (C) FIELD COMMENTS.
SOURCE IS A SOPHISTICATED
OBSERVER OF THE REGION WHOM RO TRUSTS.
THAT SAID, SOURCE’S
EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE PRESENCE OF SMALL TERRORIST CELLS.
2. (U) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR
FURTHER CONTACT.
3. (U) DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS IIR TO DIA/DHO-2 AT
STU III (703) 907-0235, OR DSN 283-0235.
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.
PREP: (U) 6-04797.
ENCL: (C) NONE.
ACQ: (U) DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN (20050807)
DISSEM: (U) FIELD:
EMBASSY AT DUSHANBE.
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
DRVD FM: DHS HUMINT SCG OCT 04
DECL ON: 20150809
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 42252
date: 10/7/2005 11:50
refid: 05DUSHANBE1642
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001642
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2015
TAGS: MCAP, TI
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0006 06/NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT LIMITATION (U)
CLASSIFIED BY: Jonathan Edwards, DATT, USDAO Dushanbe, DIA.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b)
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
SIPDIS
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 947 0006 06.
COUNTRIES: (U) TAJIKISTAN (TI),
RUSSIA (RU).
IPSP: (U) IFC2500, IFC1913,
IFC2510
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0006 06/NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT LIMITATION
(U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NO
FOREIGN
——————————————— ———
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
——————————————— ———
DOI: (U) 20051006
REQS: (U) UTCX206000504, DHCD111044, DHCD045058
SOURCE: (C) //6 947 0023 05//
HOST NATION FIELD GRADE MILITARY
OFFICER WITH DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.
USDAO HAS AN ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE. CONTEXT
STATEMENT — RO AND SOURCE MEET ON A REGULAR LIAISON BASIS AS A
RESULT OF RO’S AND SOURCE’S OFFICIAL DUTIES. SOURCE APPEARS TO
BE A STRONG SUPPORTER OF INCREASED MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN
UNITED STATES AND TAJIKISTAN. SOURCE IS AWARE THAT INFORMATION
WILL REACH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND COMMENTS MAY BE MEANT
TO INFLUENCE AS MUCH AS TO INFORM.
SUMMARY: (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND
AUS) THE NATIONAL GUARD IS NOT
CAPABLE OF DEPLOYING TO AREAS IN SOUTHEASTERN TAJIKISTAN. THE
NATIONAL GUARD ACKNOWLEDGES THERE IS A PERSISTENT THREAT IN THE
REGION.
TEXT: 1. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND
AUS) ON 6 OCTOBER 2005 RO MET
WITH SOURCE. RO ASKED SOURCE IF
THE NATIONAL GUARD HAD ANY
PLANS OF CREATING A PRESENCE IN THE GORNO-BADAKHSHAN REGION
(GBAO), GIVEN THE REGION’S PROXIMITY TO AFGHANISTAN, LIMITED
GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN THE PAST AND THE POTENTIAL FOR EXTREMIST
PRESENCE. RO NOTED THAT THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND BORDER
GUARDS ARE PRESENT IN KHOROG, BUT RO WAS UNSURE OF TAJIKISTAN’S
PRESENT COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY THERE. SOURCE RESPONDED
THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD COULD NOT AFFORD TO DEPLOY UNITS SO FAR
FROM DUSHANBE. SOURCE SAID THAT
HE WAS AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL
THREAT IN THE REGION, BUT HE HIMSELF HAD NEVER BEEN THERE.
2. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
SOURCE SAID THAT THE NATIONAL
GUARD CONTINUED TO DEVELOP ITS COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY AND
WAS AT THIS TIME THE GOVERNMENT’S SECOND RESPONSE TO TERRORIST
THREATS, AFTER THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY.
COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) FIELD COMMENT: THE
NATIONAL GUARD ACKNOWLEDGING IT LACKS THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY
TO THE GBAO REGION WAS A SURPRISE TO RO.
SOURCE HAD PREVIOUSLY
TOLD RO THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD PLANNED TO BASE A BATTALION
SOUTHEAST OF DUSHANBE. DURING
RO’S RECENT TRIP TO GBAO, RO DID
NOT SEE ANY MILITARY PRESENCE DEDICATED OR TRAINED IN DETERING
EXTREMIST/TERRORIST THREATS IN THE REGION. PREVIOUS POST
REPORTING INDICATES THEIR APPEARS TO BE GOVERNMENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT AN EXTREMIST PRESENCE EXISTS IN THE REGION,
YET AT THIS TIME NEITHER THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OR THE NATIONAL
GUARD APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY TO CONFRONT POTENTIAL
THREATS. IN ADDITION, THE TAJIKS
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS WITH
MAINTAINING AND OPERATING ITS ROTARY WING FLEET, MAKES IT
UNLIKELY THE TAJIKS RETAIN A SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY
DEPLOY UNITS FROM DUSHANBE TO THE GBAO REGION.
3. (U) SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE FOR
FURTHER CONTACT.
4. (U) DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS IIR TO DIA/DHO-2 AT
STU III (202) 231-7299, OR DSN 428-7299.
COLL: (U) AB.
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.
PREP: (U) 6-04708.
ENCL: (U) NONE.
ACQ: (U) DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN (20051006)
DISSEM: (U) FIELD:
EMBASSY AT DUSHANBE.
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DRVD FM: DHS HUMINT SCG OCT 04
DECL ON: 20151006
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 42266
date: 10/7/2005 13:26
refid: 05DUSHANBE1644
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001644
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2015
TAGS: MCAP, TI, CH
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0005 06/CHINESE GIVE 32 VEHICLES TO TAJIK ARMED
FORCES (U)
CLASSIFIED BY: Jonathan Edwards, DATT, USDAO Dushanbe, DIA.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b)
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
SIPDIS
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 947 0005 06.
COUNTRIES: (U) TAJIKISTAN (TI),
CHINA (CH).
IPSP: (U) IFC1590, IFC1950,
IFC1510, IFC1513, IFC1510, IFC1540,
IFC1500,
SUBJECT: IIR 6 947 0005 06/CHINESE GIVE 32 VEHICLES TO TAJIK
ARMED FORCES(U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NO
FOREIGN
——————————————— ———
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
——————————————— ———
DOI: (U) 20050928
REQS: (U) DHCD002124, DIAC156205002, DHCD002104, DHCD111055,
GAIF116482402, DHCD111054, DIAC154107003, DHCD111050,
DHCD111045, DHCD112051
SOURCE: A. (C) //MEMBER USDAO
DUSHANBE//MEMBER OBSERVED ON A
RECENT VISIT. CONTEXT
STATEMENT-MEMBER MAINTAINS REGULAR
CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE.
MEMBER WAS IN CLOSE
CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE THROUGHOUT THE 6 DAY TRIP.
B. (C//NF) //OTS 6 947 0001 06//
MID-LEVEL HOST NATION officer
with DIRECT AND INDIRECT access to the information. RO DOES NOT
HAVE AN ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE. context statement
— RO SPENT APPROXIMATELY 4 DAYS WITH SOURCE DURING TRIP. SOURCE
IS A CORRUPT MID-LEVEL OFFICER WITH LIMITED INTEGRITY.
CREDIBILITY IS UNDETERMINED.
C. (c) //OTS 6 947 0005
06//MID-LEVEL HOST NATION OFFICER WITH
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ACCESS TO INFORMATION. RO DOES NOT HAVE AN
ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE.
CONTEXT STATEMENT — RO
SPENT ONE DAY WITH SOURCE DURING TIP.
SOURCE APPEARS CREDIBLE,
BUT A LIKELY PARTICIPANT IN CORRUPT ACTIVITY IN REGION. SOURCE
MADE A NUMBER OF STATEMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTING CLOSE COOPERATION
WITH THE UNITED STATES.
CREDIBILITY IS UNDETERMINED.
d. (C) //6 947 0022//SENIOR HOST
NATION MILITARY OFFICER WITH
DIRECT ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.
RO HAS AN ESTABLISHED
RELATIONSHIP WITH SOURCE. CONTEXT
STATEMENT — RO AND SOURCE
MEeT ON A REGULAR LIAISON BASIS AS A RESULT OF RO AND SOURCE’S
OFFICIAL DUTIES. SOURCE HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST. THIS WAS
SOURCE’S FIRST VISIT TO THIS REGION.
SOURCE IS AWARE THAT
INFORMATION WILL REACH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND COMMENTS
MAY BE MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS MUCH AS TO INFORM.
SUMMARY: (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND
AUS) THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE PROVIDED 32 VEHICLES TO THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AS
PART OF THEIR ONE MILLION USD 2005 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.
HOWEVER, THE CHINESE HAVE MINIMAL INFLUENCE AND LIMITED
RELATIONS WITH TAJIK MILITARY AND BORDER OFFICERS IN EASTERN
TAJIKISTAN. ENCLOSURES.
TEXT: 1. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND
AUS) FROM 23 SEPTEMBER 2005 TO
29 SEPTEMBER 2005, RO TRAVELED FROM DUSHANBE TO THE EASTERN
TAJIKISTAN WITH THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE, COLONEL LEE, AND
SOURCE D IN ORDER TO PICK UP 32 CHINESE VEHICLES, GIVEN TO THE
TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THESE VEHICLES ARE PART OF A ONE
MILLION USD 2005 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE AGREED IN EARLY
SEPTEMBER BETWEEN THE CHINESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE TAJIK
MINISTER OF DEFENSE.
2. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
ON 26 SEPTEMBER SOURCE D STATED
THAT EVERY YEAR SINCE 1995 THE CHINESE HAVE PROVIDED ONE MILLION
USD IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE TAJIKS. EACH TIME THE CHINESE
SIMPLY ASKED THE TAJIKS TO MAKE OUT A LIST OF ITEMS THEY WANTED
TOTALING ONE MILLION USD. THE
CHINESE THEN PROVIDE THE ITEMS
WITH NO QUESTIONS ASKED. SOURCE D
STRESSED THAT THIS PROGRAM
HAD NO OTHER REQUIREMENTS.
3. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
ON 27 SEPTEMBER SOURCE D
COMPLAINED TO RO THAT THE CHINESE WERE ONLY GIVING THE VEHICLES
TO THE TAJIKS AND THE TAJIKS WERE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE MONEY
FOR FUEL AND DRIVERS IN ORDER TO GET THE VEHICLES FROM THE
CHINESE BORDER TO DUSHANBE.
SOURCE SHOWED RO A BAG FULL OF
APPROXIMATELY 9000 TAJIK SOMONI; THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE IS
APPROXIMATELY 3 SOMONI TO 1 USD.
SOURCE DID NOT KNOW HOW HE WAS
GOING TO PAY FOR ALL THE CUSTOMS COSTS AND FUEL. SOURCE STATED
THE CHINESE SHOULD FOLLOW THE U.S. PROGRAM, WHICH DELIVERS
EQUIPMENT TO DUSHANBE WITH NO COST TO THE TAJIKS.
4. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
ON 27 SEPTEMBER SOURCE B TOLD
RO THAT THE TAJIK MILITARY HAD A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING THE
CHINESE. THE MILITARY IN THE
GORNO-BADAKSHAN REGION, THAT
BORDERS CHINA, HAD NO CONTACT WITH CHINESE MILITARY OFFICERS.
HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS THE FIRST CHINESE
MILITARY OFFICER HE HAD MET. HE
NOTED THAT THE CHINESE TRADE IS
INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN THE REGION AND HE SEES CHINESE CARGO
TRUCKS TRAVELING THROUGH THE REGION NEARLY EVERY DAY. SOURCE
QUESTIONED WHY THE CHINESE DO NOT HAVE A BUSINESS PRESENCE OR
ANY OTHER LEVEL OF ACTIVITY WITH THE CITY OF MURGHAB, 120
KILOMETERS WEST OF THE TAJIK BORDER. [FIELD COMMENT: RO OBSERVED
INDIVIDUALS LOADING CHINESE TRUCKS WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE
LARGE SACKS AT A LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 4 KILOMETERS EAST OF
MURGHAB, BEHIND SOME ABANDONED BUILDINGS. IN ADDITION, RO MET
THE MURGHAB POLICE CHIEF APPROXIMATELY 1 KILOMETER FROM THE
SITE. THE POLICE CHIEF SAID HE
WAS WAITING FOR SOME CHINESE
DIGNITARIES WHO WERE TRAVELING TO THE CELEBRATION IN KHOROG. RO
COULD NOT CONFIRM IF THE POLICE CHIEFS PRESENCE AND THE ACTIVITY
WERE CONNECTED. HOWEVER, GIVEN
THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN
MURGHAB, IT IS POSSIBLE.]
5. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
ON 28 SEPTEMBER RO AND COLONEL
LEE MET WITH THE DEPUTY COMMANDER, LTC MIRZOEV OF THE TAJIK
BORDER GUARD OTRYAD IN MURGHAB.
LTC MIRZOEV NOTED THAT DESPITE
THE LONG BORDER SHARED BY TAJIKISTAN AND CHINA, HE VERY SELDOM
MEETS WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM CHINA.
HE COMPLAINED THAT THE
TAJIK BORDER GUARDS AND CHINESE BORDER GUARDS HAVE NO WORKING
RELATIONSHIP. COLONEL LEE TOLD
LTC MIRZOEV THAT IF THE TAJIKS
HAD ANY PROBLEMS WITH CHINESE AT THE BORDER TO CALL THE CHINESE
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. LTC
MIRZOEV SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER TO
DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS LOCALLY BETWEEN THE TWO BORDER GUARD
FORCES.
6. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
ON 28 SEPTEMBER RO WAS TOLD BY
SOURCE D THAT RO COULD NOT ACCOMPANY THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE
DEFENSE ATTACHE TO THE BORDER IN ORDER TO PICK UP THE VEHICLES.
SOURCE SAID THAT THE CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE SAID IT WOULD BE
INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATED DEFENSE ATTACHE TO BE SEEN
AT THE BORDER WITH TAJIK MILITARY PERSONNEL.
7. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING, RO
OBSERVED THE CONTRACTED CIVILIAN TAJIK DRIVERS PUTTING ON
MILITARY UNIFORMS. IN RESPONSE TO
RO’S QUESTION, ONE DRIVER
SAID CHINESE CUSTOMS WERE REQUIRING THAT ONLY TAJIK MILITARY
PERSONNEL PICK UP THE VEHICLES.
[FIELD COMMENT: CUSTOMS TURNED
OUT TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR THE TAJIKS. RO OBSERVED
ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS SOURCE D PAYING A NUMBER OF LOCAL
OFFICIALS IN MURGHAB TO INCLUDE CUSTOMS, MINISTRY OF SECURITY
AND POLICE PRIOR TO PICKING UP THE VEHICLES. IN ADDITION, THE
MINISTRY OF SECURITY, CUSTOMS, BORDER GUARDS AND LOCAL POLICE
ALL ACCOMPANIED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO THE BORDER TO PICK UP
THE VEHICLES].
8. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) LATER ON 28 SEPTEMBER, RO
OBSERVED THE ARRIVAL OF 32 CHINESE VEHICLES, INITIALLY PARKED AT
THE MURGHAB BORDER GUARD OTRYAD //GEOCOORD:
3810.119N/07357.901E//. THE
VEHICLES CONSISTED OF 20 LIGHT
«JEEP» LIKE THAT APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE CHINESE BJ2020, 10
TRUCKS WITH «FAW» LETTERING THAT APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE
CHINESE
EQ2102, A SMALL AMBULANCE WITH «IVECO» LETTERING THAT THE
CHINESE AND TAJIK CALLED A SMALL X-RAY AMBULANCE AND A LARGER
AMBULANCE WITH «DONG FENG» LETTERING THE CHINESE AND TAJIKS
CALLED A LARGE AUTOBANDAGING MEDICAL VEHICLE. ALL VEHICLES
APPEARED TO BE NEW. SOURCE D
EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION HALF OF THE
VEHICLES REQUIRED DIESEL THE OTHERS GASOLINE. SOURCE EXPRESSED
A PREFERENCE FOR THE RUSSIAN VEHICLES THAT ALL REQUIRE GASOLINE.
[FIELD COMMENT: PLEASE SEE ENCLOSURES FOR PICTURES OF VEHICLES.
THE CHINESE AND THE TAJIKS COULD NOT PROVIDE RO WITH THE ENGLISH
DESIGNATION FOR THESE VEHICLES].
9. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) AFTER THE VEHICLES ARRIVED LTC
MIRZOEV OF THE BORDER GUARDS APPROACHED COLONEL LEE AND ASKED
WHY ALL THESE VEHICLES WERE GOING TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.
MIRZOEV NOTED THAT THE BORDER GUARDS HELPED BRING THE VEHICLES
ACROSS THE BORDER AND THE CHINESE TO DATE HAVE PROVIDED NO
ASSISTANCE TO HIS BORDER GUARD UNIT.
COLONEL LEE RESPONDED THAT
THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WORKS THROUGH THE TAJIK MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE AND COORDINATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE BORDER GUARDS
WOULD NEED TO GO THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. MIRZOEV THEN
PULLED COLONEL LEE AWAY FROM RO FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. MIRZOEV
THEN RETURNED TO RO AND SAID THAT HE DEEPLY APPRECIATED THE
STRONG ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES THE BORDER GUARDS.
HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE TAJIK BORDER GUARDS
BRIGHTEST STAR IN THE SKY.
10. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
COLONEL LEE LATER TOLD RO THAT
THE TAJIKS DO NOT KNOW HOW TO RECEIVE THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE
AND HE EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE TAJIKS LACK OF ORGANIZATION.
HE ADDED THAT HE WISHED THE
VEHICLES HAD AIR CONDITIONING FOR
THE HOT TAJIK SUMMERS.
11. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
RO ASKED A NUMBER OF DRIVERS
WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE VEHICLES.
RO ASKED FIVE DRIVERS WHAT
THEY THOUGHT OF THE CHINESE VEHICLES.
TWO HAD NO OPINION, TWO
EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE QUALITY AND FELT RUSSIAN
EQUIVALENT VEHICLES RAN BETTER, AND ONE FELT THE CHINESE VEHICLE
WAS A BETTER RIDE.
12. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS)
RO ACCOMPANIED THE CONVOY FROM
MURGHAB TO KHOROG. DURING THE
DRIVE THREE VEHICLES BROKE DOWN
OF WHICH ONE REMAINED IN PLACE APPROXIMATELY 20 KILOMETERS WEST
OF MURGHAB. ON THE MORNING OF 29
SEPTEMBER AS THE CONVOY
PREPARED TO DEPART KHOROG, SOURCE D TOLD RO THAT TWO ADDITIONAL
VEHICLES WERE MISSING. SOURCE D
EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT
NEEDING TO HIRE CIVILIAN DRIVERS AS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DID
NOT HAVE ENOUGH TRAINED, RESPONSIBLE DRIVERS TO MAKE SUCH A
TRIP. SOURCE D ALSO REITERATED
HIS CONCERN THAT HE DID NOT HAVE
ENOUGH MONEY TO GET THE VEHICLES BACK TO DUSHANBE. [FIELD
COMMENT: RO DEPARTED KHOROG BEFORE THE CONVOY DEPARTED. RO WAS
LATER TOLD THAT ALL VEHICLES EXPECT THE ONE TRUCK, EQ2102 TYPE,
SUCCESSFULLY ARRIVED IN DUSHANBE].
13. (C) DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHIC TITLING LOG. ALL PHOTOGRAPHIC
ENCLOSURES TO IIR 6 947 0005 06 ARE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.
THEY WERE ACQUIRED AT THE MURGHAB BORDER GUARD OTRYAD, MURGHAB,
//GEOCOORD:3810.119N/07357.901E//, TAJIKISTAN, ON 20050928
BETWEEN 1600L AND 1700L USING A SONY CYBERSHOT 7.2 MEGAPIXEL, SN
1411693, GROUND.
FRAMES DESCRIPTION
01 TAJIK CIVILIAN DRIVERS
AFTER RETURNING WITH
VEHICLES. (C)
02 1 TRUCK, LARGE
AMBULANCE AND 3 LIGHT VEHICLES. (C)
03 8 LIGHT VEHICLES. (C)
04 2 LIGHT VEHICLES, 2
TRUCKS, TAJIK BORDER GUARD
SOLDIERS. (c)
05 3 TRUCKS, SMALL
AMBULANCE. (C)
06 WIDE ANGLE ON 12 LIGHT
VEHICLES, 1 TRUCK, LARGE
AMBULANCE. (C)
07 TAJIKS GOING OVER
PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTED DRIVERS. (C)
08 CHINESE TRUCKS BEING
LOADED WITH UNKNOWN GOODS
APPROXIMATELY 4 KM EAST OF MURGHAB. (C)
COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL TO USA, GBR AND AUS) FIELD COMMENT: RO WAS
SURPRISED THAT THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE INVITED RO
ALONG ON THIS TRIP. ONE REASON
COULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE THE
LEVEL OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.
THE OTHER COULD BE THE TAJIKS AND CHINESE DEFENSE ATTACHE
REQUIRED RO ASSISTANCE TO GET TO THIS PART OF TAJIKISTAN. THE
ROADS ARE VERY DIFFICULT AND RO IS UNAWARE OF ANY VEHICLE AT THE
CHINESE EMBASSY CAPABLE OF MAKING THIS JOURNEY. IN ADDITION, RO
PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION SAVED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MONEY.
SOURCE D NOTED A NUMBER OF TIMES THAT IT WAS FAR EASIER TO
TRAVEL TO THIS RESTRICTED PART OF TAJIKISTAN IN A UNITED STATES
DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE THAN IN A MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PLATED VEHICLE.
THE CHALLENGES THE TAJIKS FACED
IN GETTING THESE VEHICLES FROM
THE CHINESE BORDER TO DUSHANBE IS FURTHER INDICATION THE TAJIKS
HAVE LITTLE TO NO CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN BASIC SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS. THE REQUIREMENT
THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PAY
OFF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN FEES, IS FURTHER INDICATION OF SYSTEMIC
CORRUPTION AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT.
IT APPEARED TO RO THAT
MOST IF NOT ALL TAJIK MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SAW THIS
CHINESE ASSISTANCE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE SOME FORM OF
PAYOFF. RO SELDOM HAD THE SENSE
THAT TAJIK OFFICIALS FELT ANY
SENSE OF LOYALTY OR SATISFACTION THAT THEY WERE HELPING THEIR
OWN GOVERNMENT IMPROVE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY.
2. (U) SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE FOR
FURTHER CONTACT.
3. (U) DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS IIR TO DIA/DHO-2 AT
STU III (202) 231-7299, OR DSN 428-7299.
COLL: (U) AB.
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.
PREP: (U) 6-04708.
ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW — 1 ENCLOSURE.
DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHY, BORDER GUARD OTRYAD, MURGHAB (C), COLOR, 8
IMAGES, 20050928 (C).
ACQ: (U) MURGHAB, TAJIKISTAN (20050928)
DISSEM: (U) FIELD:
EMBASSY AT DUSHANBE.
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DRVD FM: DHS HUMINT SCG OCT 04
DECL ON: 20150928
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 42330
date: 10/8/2005 10:07
refid: 05DUSHANBE1646
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001646
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MERKEL; PLEASE PASS TO USAID
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2015
TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: NO NEWS BAD NEWS FOR INTERNEWS
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Internews is the
third major NGO to encounter
serious registration problems with the Tajik government. In
addition, a key Internews project to establish community radio
stations may collapse without the registration and licensing of
its local partners. Government
officials have confided to
Internews staff that Ministry of Security officials forbade the
Ministry of Justice to re-register Internews, allegedly
declaring that Internews is «the enemy». The increased
government obstruction of independent media bodes poorly for
Tajikistan’s image as an emerging democracy on the road to
reform. END SUMMARY
2. (C) On October 5, Country
Director Troy Etulain reported
Internews attempted to re-register with the Ministry of Justice
after a May investigation revealed Internews was operating under
the wrong legal status. The
Minister of Justice was prepared to
accept Internews’ new application, but at the last minute
rejected it on technical grounds.
MoJ officials told Internews
the Ministry of Security directly intervened on the basis of
«national security.»
3. (SBU) In addition to the issue
of registration, an $887,000
State Department-funded project to establish six independent
community radio stations throughout the country may not get off
the ground due to bureaucratic obstacles. None of the local
organizations have been able to register as legal organizations,
let alone obtain a license to broadcast.
Without the
registration and license, they cannot broadcast legally. The
long delayed new licensing regulations have been issued but not
the implementation documents.
4. (C) Etulain reported local
state media stations have started
to refuse to accept programming from Internews directly and
stopped broadcasting Internews materials months ago. However,
the new second state television channel, Safina, has used
Internews materials during its programming. He noted that as
recently as last week, the Deputy Director of Safina approached
him about a «creative partnership» to help with programming
and
technical training.
5. (C) According to Etulain,
Safina has already cost the
government $1 million in new equipment and further funds to
renovate the historic old philharmonic building in central
Dushanbe as Safina’s new production studio. He passed along the
rumor that Safina may be sold to private investors early in
2006-and that the purchaser may be First Brother-in-Law Hasan
Sadulloyev. (COMMENT: It has long been rumored that Sadulloyev
would gain a license for the first private TV channel with
national coverage in Tajikistan, but that he could not afford,
or did not want to pay for, the start-up costs. END COMMENT)
6. (SBU) Etulain expressed
frustration at his programs being
«stuck» and admitted there was little Internews could do,
short
of withdrawing all the equipment from Tajikistan. This would
however, eliminate almost any independent broadcast media in
Tajikistan. «We are
contractually obligated to do things we
cannot do legally. We are trying
to follow the law, but the
Tajiks themselves are not following their own laws.»
7. (SBU) Internews’ licensing
problems touch on a larger issue
of the government’s new licensing regime. According to Etulain,
it explicitly states that foreign nationals or organizations
«under the control» of foreign nationals cannot receive a
license. The licensing regime
applies to stations and well as
production studios. The
interpretation of «under the control»
remains to be determined, but Etulain doubted the MoJ would
recognize agreements like programming requirements attached to
grants as anything other than direct control.
8. (SBU) NOTE: The licensing
issue, including of production
facilities, raises profound problems for Internews with its
USAID-funded «Satellite Transmission Program.» Independent
Tajik
television stations broadcasting «unlicensed»
Internews-provided
material direct from satellite would risk being closed by the
government for violating licensing regulations. END NOTE
9. (C) COMMENT: Post agrees with Etulain’s assessment that a
concerted governmental campaign against Internews is underway.
The clear and consistent pattern of government obstruction,
using legal pretexts for a political result, sends a dangerous
message the very few journalists and civil society members
willing to go to the mat for a free press and access to
information. However, some in the government seem to understand
that NGOs are not the source of «Color Revolutions» and help
maintain a balance against the true hardliners. END COMMENT
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 42342
date: 10/10/2005 7:08
refid: 05DUSHANBE1648
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05DUSHANBE1645
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001648
SIPDIS
STATE FOR T, EUR/CACEN, SA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, IR, KN, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: CIVIL AND
GOVERNMENT AVIATION AUTHORITIES
SUPPORT PSI
REF: DUSHANBE 1645
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d), (h)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 6, Under Secretary Robert Joseph
met with Head of the Tajikistan Department of Civil Aviation
Khamroyev Firuz and Tajik Air Force Chief of Staff General-Major
Safaraliev. The Tajiks reiterated
their support for ridding the
world of the scourge of terrorism and the transfer of weapons of
mass destruction. The Tajiks
highlighted the challenges they
face, given their lack of capacity to deter movement through
their country.
2. (C) U/S Joseph noted, during
his initial remarks, U.S.
efforts to foster a regional approach to stop the transfer of
WMD, missile, and related materials between Iran and North
Korea. He pointed out that
Central Asian countries lay at the
crossroads of such transfers. He
promoted working together in
the areas of info sharing, denial of overflight rights and
inspection. Mr. Joseph provided a
map of air routes used by the
North Koreans and Iranians and a list of aircraft tail numbers.
3. (C) Firuz noted Tajik aviation
control is divided between
civil aviation and government aviation.
Each element has norms
and procedures that follow international standards. He said
Tajikistan is a sovereign state that continues to make sure all
flights in, out, and over conform to international standards.
Controlling WMD- and missile-related traffic is the
responsibility of all nations.
The Department of Civil Aviation
controls civil air and customs; government aviation controls air
space and security. Firuz
introduced General-Major Safaraliev
as the primary officer responsible for government aviation.
4. (C) Safaraliev said the
military speaks differently and
normally with a glass of «white tea» (vodka). He said he had
only found out that day about the meeting and was not really
prepared to talk. He added that
soldiers simply follow
agreements and orders made by the President. Since the
President has agreed to cooperate, he would follow his orders.
5. (C) The Under Secretary offered to share information and
conduct action with low visibility.
He pointed out that
overflight clearance and the searching and seizing of cargo are
within the rights of sovereign states.
6. (C) Firuz initially expressed
concern should Tajikistan deny
overflight or force the landing of an aircraft wrongly accused
of caring illegal materials, but appeared satisfied with U.S.
Joseph’s response to his questions.
He pointed out that North
Korea and Iran would send diplomatic notes charging Tajikistan
with inappropriate action. U/S
Joseph noted that nothing is 100
percent guaranteed, but that is included in the task of stopping
this type of trade. He added that
the sharing of information
and working relationships build confidence. U/S Joseph compared
action against aircraft to Tajikistan’s sovereign right to
monitor and search trucks carrying cargo across its borders.
7. (C) Firuz asked how they can
develop the expertise to
conduct inspections. He noted
that Tajikistan does not have WMD
and it will be difficult to develop the right expertise. In
addition, the Tajiks asked how to understand and properly deny
materials that have duel use purposes.
U/S Joseph reiterated
the need for building working relations and it all started with
sharing information.
8. (C) The Tajiks concluded by
expressing support for the
initiative to stem the trade of proliferation-related materials
within the framework of international law.
9. (U) U/S Joseph cleared this
cable.
HOAGLAND
