Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 222533
date: 8/27/2009 11:10
refid: 09DUSHANBE1016
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE617|09DUSHANBE631|09DUSHANBE664|09STATE50245
header:
VZCZCXRO2306
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1016/01 2391110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271110Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0694
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUZFMXI/CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0225
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0149
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1463
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001016
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA, S/CT
CENTCOM FOR J5, SOCCENT J3, SOCCENT CEG
DIA FOR DHO-2
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/2019
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TAVILDARA
REF: A. IIR 6 947 0082 09
B. TD-314/034252-09
C. DUSHANBE 0617
D. STATE 50245
E. DUSHANBE 0631
F. DUSHANBE 0664
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L. Quast, Charge D’ Affairs, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (d), (g)
1. (U) On Sunday August 23, the Regional Security Officer and
FSNI embarked on a journey southward to observe the Tajik/Afghan
border area and then northward to Tavildara and the Rasht valley
area to assess the security situation.
Host nation police and
military units recently wrapped up anti-terrorist operations in
the Tavildara area. All travel
was conducted in an embassy
vehicle displaying diplomatic license plates.
2. (C) The RSO covered
approximately 110 kilometers along the
Tajik/Afghan border from the Shurobad area to the Darvaz area.
The RSO negotiated two border police checkpoints and observed
approximately six border guard foot patrols (roughly one three
to four man foot patrol every 18 kilometers). The foot patrols
did not appear to be tactical in nature due to a lack of
dispersion among patrol members.
Patrol members were equipped
with AK-47s and in some cases binoculars.
3. (C) The RSO encountered little difficulty in negotiating
border patrol checkpoints. The
RSO was never requested to
produce any identification documents or diplomatic credentials.
4. (C) The RSO was able to
negotiate a checkpoint at the
entrance to the city of Tavildara without undue hassle. The
Tavildara entrance checkpoint was manned by uniformed Ministry
of Interior Police. When
requested by the MVD police, the RSO
produced his Diplomatic Passport, Tajikistan Visa and Diplomatic
Accreditation Card. The FSNI was
asked to produce his passport
which the MVD police subsequently registered.
5. (C) A cursory vehicle tour of
the city of Tavildara revealed
no sign of a police or military presence and very few people on
the street.
6. (U) On August 18, the RSO hosted a representational event at
a local restaurant. In attendance
were Colonel Makhmadshoev
Khurshed, Commander of OMON, and Lieutenant Colonel Dimitry
Buriev, Deputy Commander of OMON (Militia Special Purpose
Detachment). OMON directed recent
counter-terrorist operations
against purported IMU Islamic terrorists in mountainous terrain
no more than two kilometers outside of the city of Tavildara.
7. (C) According to the OMON Commanders, ATA trained OMON
snipers successfully engaged targets from as far away as 900
meters, even shooting one person between the eyes, with the
AR-10(T) sniper rifle provided by the ATA program. The RSO was
not able to elicit the exact number of casualties or the number
of men that may have escaped, however it was implied that many
were killed by OMON snipers.
8. (C) OMON Commanders requested night vision scopes and
silencers for their AR-10(T) sniper rifles and additional
training. They also pledged their
assistance to the RSO in
maintaining the security of the U.S. Embassy.
9. (C) Currently all official USG
travel to Tavildara and the
Rasht Valley is restricted. With
the cessation of direct action
DUSHANBE 00001016 002 OF 002
against targets in the area, the departure of host nation
special police and military units from the area, and the RSO’s
first hand observation that the area has returned to normal, the
RSO will recommend next week that the EAC discontinue the
current travel restrictions on Tavildara and the Rash Valley.
10. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related
information at Post is Regional Security Officer Erik Olerud.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 223202
date: 9/1/2009 17:19
refid: 09STATE91068
origin: Secretary of State
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE996
header:
VZCZCXRO6302
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHC #1068 2441736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011719Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 1111
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 091068
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/19
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDRG, TI
SUBJECT: FORMER GTMO DETAINEE REQUEST FOR MEDICAL RECORDS AND
POSSIBLE COMPENSATION
REF: DUSHANBE 0996
Classified by S/GC deputy Anthony P. Ricci. Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
1. (U) This is an action
message. Please see para 2.
2. (C) In response to reftel
request, Department provides the
following information that can be passed on to Tajik former
Guantanamo detainees Shafi Rakhimovich Salikhov, aka, Maroof
Saleemovich Salehove (ISN-208),and Mehrabon Faizulovich Odinaev
(ISN-077). On the request for medical records, DOD provides to the
receiving government a copy of the detainee’s medical records and
sufficient medication (if required) to treat any illness present at
the time of transfer. DOD does
not provide each detainee with a copy
of these medical records.
Salikhov should approach the Tajik
government with his request for his records. (Note:
Medical files
on Guantanamo detainees are not available in electronic format. As a
matter of standard practice, DOD does not provide each detainee with
a separate copy of their medical files.
DOD does not consider there
to be any unique circumstances in these cases to consider
establishing a new precedent). End Note).
3.(C) Regarding Salikhov and Odinaev’s request for compensation, as a
matter of standard practice, the USG does not pay compensation to
detainees.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 223247
date: 9/2/2009 4:19
refid: 09DUSHANBE1046
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09STATE58996
header:
VZCZCXRO6526
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1046 2450419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020419Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0703
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1517
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001046
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT FOR EEB/TPP/MTAA/ABT JSPECK, GCLEMENTS, DMORTON
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, EAID, PREL, G8, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK RESPONSE TO GLOBAL ACTION ON FOOD SECURITY DEMARCHE
REF: STATE 58996
1. (U) In a diplomatic note dated August 20, 2009, the
government of Tajikistan provided a short response to post’s
demarche seeking a new approach to food security in advance of
the L’Aquila Summit. The note, in
its entirety, reads as
follows:
Begin note:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of
American in the Republic of Tajikistan and in response to its
note of July 2, 2009, has the honor to inform that the
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan supports the new
approach of the Government of the United States to global food
security.
This initiative of the U.S. Government can contribute to the
agricultural and real sector of the economic development of
Tajikistan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the
United States of America the assurances of its highest
consideration.
End note.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 223745
date: 9/4/2009 10:40
refid: 09DUSHANBE1059
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8726
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1059/01 2471040
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041040Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0721
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0229
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0001
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1543
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001059
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EINV, PREL, EAID, TI, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR TO BUILD FIRST-CLASS RETAIL & RESIDENTIAL COMPLEX IN
DUSHANBE. REALLY?
DUSHANBE 00001059 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company in
Tajikistan recently announced plans to build a large office,
retail and residential development in central Dushanbe. Office
Manager Manuchehr Kurbonali said the project is the result of
direct talks between President Rahmon and the Emir of Qatar in
2007. Kurbonali said corruption
in Tajikistan was endemic at
all levels, not only among government officials but
international financial institutions and international
organizations as well. Bidding on
projects was rigged to
extract bribes from bidders.
Rahmon’s deep personal interest in
the Qatari project would make it the «cleanest development in
Tajikistan,» Kurbonali said.
End summary.
2. (U) On August 27 the Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment
Company held a joint presentation with the Tajik government, led
by President Rahmon, to announce the construction of a large
office, retail, and residential development in central Dushanbe.
The «Diar Dushanbe»
project first emerged in 2007, after
President Rahmon met for the first time with Qatari leader Hamad
bin Khalifa al-Thani. Qatari
Diar, whose General Director is
Ghanim bin Saad al-Saad, is wholly owned by the Qatari
government. The $180 million
Dushanbe development will include
five residential apartment buildings ranging from 10 to 16
stories, one 127-room hotel (some twenty rooms will be reserved
for hotel staff), three office buildings, and 7,110 square
meters of retail space.
Construction will proceed in three
phases. In Phase One, to begin in
the first quarter of 2010 and
last four or five months, the hotel and one of the residential
towers will be built. In Phase
Two additional residential
towers and retail space will be added.
The rest of the
development will be completed in Phase Three. Timelines for the
final two phases have not been set.
There are informal plans to
build a Qatari embassy and open a Qatari bank branch on the
site. Plans to build a large
mosque are more vague and separate
from the Diar project.
3. (SBU) According to Manuchehr Kurbonali, the Tajik citizen who
heads Qatari Diar’s office in Dushanbe, while the Qatari
government certainly intends to make a profit from the
residential and commercial space it sells in Diar Dushanbe,
there are less economic motivations at work as well. Kurbonali
said first and foremost these involve personal ties between the
Qatari leader and President Rahmon.
«When the Emir gives his
word to fund a project, he will do it no matter the economic
consequences,» Kurbonali said.
«He is wealthy enough not to
worry about the economics.»
He speculated to Embassy staff in a
September 2 meeting that the Qatari government might also be
interested in gaining a foothold in Central Asia.
A Foothold on a Sinking Ship?
4. (SBU) Given that Dushanbe is a relatively small, poor city
with almost no tourism industry or foreign business travelers,
the rationale behind constructing a new top-end hotel here is
questionable — all the more so since there are three existing
five-star projects: the recently-completed Hyatt, owned by
Russian aluminum giant Rusal; the soon-to-open Serena, being
built by the Aga Khan; and the Ismoili Somoni, with financing
from President Rahmon’s brother-in-law, Hasan Asadullozoda.
Even now, as the sole operating five star hotel, the Hyatt is
very underbooked. Kurbonali said
that the Diar Dushanbe hotel,
which would be managed by a reputable international chain that
has not yet been determined, had a competitive advantage over
the other properties, since it would be part of a larger retail
complex that would be more appealing to travelers. He also said
that the other hotels were being built for questionable reasons.
The Hyatt, for example, was built
simply to launder money.
«That hotel could have been built for $30 million. The fact
that it cost $150 million indicates to me that its purpose was
to launder money.»
Rahmon Chomping at Bit
5. (SBU) Kurbonali said President Rahmon had taken an active
DUSHANBE 00001059 002.2 OF 003
personal interest in the project.
Rahmon would be able to see
the development from his desk in the newly-built Presidential
Palace, and he intended to monitor its progress daily.
(Kurbonali added that the height of the residential towers was
established so they would be lower than the Presidential
Palace.) Rahmon may have
unrealistic expectations for Diar
Dushanbe’s completion. At the
August 27 press conference, it
was reported that the whole development would be completed
within one and a half years.
According to Kurbonali, however,
the President made this figure up out of thin air, announcing it
in front of the microphones without consulting anyone first.
Before Qatari Diar could set the record straight, the discussion
had moved on to other topics, and media reported the uncorrected
figure. Kurbonali said that,
apart from Phase One, no deadlines
had yet been set for the development, although it would
certainly take longer than 18 months to complete.
An Inside View of Corruption in Tajikistan
6. (SBU) The Diar Dushanbe project was likely to be the «least
corrupt in Tajikistan,» because of the President’s personal
interest and involvement in it, according to Kurbonali. «No one
will play any games» with this development, he said. He
acknowledged, however, that corruption was a serious problem in
Tajikistan, and he shared some examples of how payoffs and
kickbacks worked for large projects.
Kurbonali worked last year
in the project implementation unit for the Ministry of Health,
which was putting out bids for a new hospital in Dangara, the
President’s hometown in the south of Tajikistan. He saw
firsthand how the project manager in the Ministry informed
bidders how much to inflate their tenders in order to make
kickbacks to her. Since the
project was receiving international
financing, all involved viewed it as a win-win scenario.
7. (SBU) After seven years working with the Belgium-based
medical supply company MedConcept, Kurbonali recently set off on
his own in the same field, founding Avrocom, LLC. He said a
recent contract was put out for bid in Tajikistan’s northern
Sughd region to outfit a diagnostic center. The project
required about $3.5 million worth of work, yet he heard from
contacts in the Ministry of Health that Siemens was likely to
win the contract with an $8 million bid.
Kurbonali believed the
remaining $4.5 million was being siphoned off as kickbacks.
Although Avrocom was not in a position to bid on the project,
Kurbonali asked a reputable Danish firm with whom he had a
connection to consider putting in a bid, just so that Siemens
was not uncontested. He had no
doubt that Siemens would get the
award based on disqualification of the Danish firm on a
technicality. Kurbonali noted
that Siemens had recently been
banned from bidding on World Bank projects because of corrupt
practices. (Note: While Kurbonali
implied that the ban
originated in Russia, the World Bank in fact placed a two-year
moratorium on contracting with the German company on projects in
Bangladesh. End note.)
8. (SBU) When asked what could realistically be done to curb
corruption in Tajikistan, Kurbonali said he had had the idea to
set up a website that documented corrupt practices, naming names
and providing information to businesspeople. The website, if it
had enough visibility, could not only make it more difficult for
corrupt officials to operate by «naming and shaming» them, but
it would also provide a service to businesses interested in
navigating through the bureaucracy.
Kurbonali said such a
website would have to be operated offshore, and several shields
would have to be used to hide the identity of its operators. He
said this would not be difficult, however. The company could be
set up in Panama, for instance, and registered to Panamanian
citizens. These citizens could
give power of attorney to the de
facto operators. On the technical
side, the website would
operate through multiple mirror sites, so that the government
could not shut it down in Tajikistan.
Kurbonali said such a
site would be popular enough that it would generate respectable
advertising revenue.
9. (SBU) Comment: Despite the government’s and Qatari Diar’s
enthusiasm, there are a number of aspects about the Diar
DUSHANBE 00001059 003.2 OF 003
Dushanbe project that do not make sense.
The city doesn’t need
another five-star hotel, nor is it clear that it has enough
wealthy inhabitants to buy residential units, or that
contractors can be found to complete the project to
specifications. Dushanbe has a
history of big plans that never
happen, including a Turkish water park, state-of-the art cotton
processing centers, and fancy malls.
Perhaps even more
questionable is Kurbonali’s claim that, as a result of the
President’s personal involvement, Diar Dushanbe will be the
cleanest project in Tajikistan.
The President has also been
personally involved in the Hyatt, Serena, and Somoni hotels, as
well as the massive Palace of the Nation project — yet by
Kurbonali’s own admission at least one of those projects was
mired in corruption. Expatriates
overseeing these developments
have also complained to us on numerous occasions of endemic
corruption which delays their completion. End comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 224026
date: 9/8/2009 12:54
refid: 09ISLAMABAD2160
origin: Embassy Islamabad
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0283
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHIL #2160/01 2511254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081254Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4446
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0829
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0518
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5149
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2530
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1010
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1878
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0165
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1343
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 1878
INFO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002160
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ FOR OC; OGE/MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER, SULLIVAN, ROSPOND;
OT/SHROYER, OTF/BROOKE; NIRE/LEHRER, JACOBS; NTRE/UPP; FOE; SARI;
SOD/HAMLETT, SOILES, EDDINGTON, MILIONE, OEMLER
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR RD DESTITO
AMEMBASSY KABUL FOR RD MARSAC
DEA LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION / SA BULLOCK / FIG
E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: XZ-09-0004 / YEH1K /
NAWAB, ARSHAD — INTERCEPTED
CONVERSATIONS OF CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER 92-300-231-7612 UTILIZED BY
ARSHAD NAWAB — POTENTIAL HEROIN TRAFFICKING FROM PAKISTAN TO NORTH
KOREA BY THE NAWAB DTO.
CCX: WP-09-0004 / TSAMBOS, PETER
R1-09-0270 / WARDAK, TARIQ
ACTION REQUEST TO DEA BEIJING CO AND DUBAI CO. (PARAGRAPHS 9 AND
10)
1. (SBU) THE ISLAMABAD COUNTRY OFFICE (ICO) IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
PAKISTAN ANTI-NARCOTICS FORCE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT (ANF/SIU)
HAS AN ACTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ARSHAD NAWAB POLYDRUG/PRECURSOR
CHEMICAL (HEROIN, HASHISH, ACETIC ANHYDRIDE) TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATION. IN MARCH 2009, THE
MAIN TARGET OF THIS INVESTIGATION,
ARSHAD NAWAB COORDINATED A 20 KILOGRAM HEROIN SHIPMENT TO MELBOURNE,
AUSTRALIA. IN MARCH 2009, THE
ICO, WORKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH
PAKISTAN CUSTOMS AND THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE (AFP) CONDUCTED
AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROLLED DELIVERY (ICD) FROM PAKISTAN TO
AUSTRALIA. THE ICD RESULTED IN
THE ARREST OF THREE ORGANIZED CRIME
MEMBERS IN AUSTRALIA. THE
INVESTIGATION ALSO IDENTIFIED TARIQ
WARDAK, WHO RESIDES IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, AS A POSSIBLE MONEY
REMITTER AND DIRECT MEMBER OF THE NAWAB DTO.
2. (SBU) ICO DEBRIEFINGS OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, CS-85-039697 (CS),
HAVE REVEALED THAT NAWAB CONSISTENTLY PROPOSITIONS THE CS TO ASSIST
WITH THE ILLICIT IMPORTATION OF METRIC TONS OF ACETIC ANHYDRIDE INTO
PAKISTAN. NAWAB ALSO REQUESTED
THE CS TO ASSIST IN THE
INTERNATIONAL EXPORTATION OF KILOGRAM QUANTITIES OF AFGHANISTAN
HEROIN AND METRIC TONS OF HASHISH FROM PAKISTAN TO CANADA AND SOUTH
EAST/SOUTH WEST ASIA. THE CS
INFORMED AGENTS THAT NAWAB’S
LEGITIMATE BUSINESS CONSISTS OF IMPORTING MISCELLANEOUS COMMERCIAL
PRODUCTS FROM CHINA TO PAKISTAN.
3. (SBU) DURING THE PAST YEAR, THE ICO REQUESTED THAT THE ANF/SIU
MONITOR NAWAB’S CELLULAR TELEPHONE NUMBER (92-300-231-7612) TO
GATHER GREATER INTELLIGENCE INTO THE NAWAB DTO.
4. (SBU) ON AUGUST 24, 2009 THE ANF/SIU PROVIDED THE ICO WITH A
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF INTERCEPTED PHONE CONVERSATIONS FOR PHONE
NUMBER 92-300-231-7612 DATING FROM JUNE 1, 2009 TO AUGUST 8, 2009.
(AGENT’S NOTE: THE ANF/SIU TRANSLATED LINE SHEETS HAVE BEEN REDACTED
AND ARE MISSING IMPERATIVE INFORMATION RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL
CELLULAR TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND SPECIFIC DRUG RELATED CONVERSATION).
5. (SBU) BASED UPON AN ICO REVIEW OF INTERCEPTED CONVERSATIONS, IT
IS BELIEVED THAT NAWAB HAD PURCHASED CONEX TYPE SHIPPING CONTAINERS
FROM UNKNOWN PERSONS (NO NUMBER LISTED) THAT WILL BE USED FOR
SHIPPING ‘FABRIC’ TO THE SEAPORT IN NAMPHO, NORTH KOREA. THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CONVERSATION STEMS FROM A RECENT JOINT
ICO/PAKISTAN CUSTOMS INVESTIGATION (AUGUST 2009) WHICH IDENTIFIED
CONTAINERIZED SHIPMENTS OF FABRICS ORIGINATING FROM KARACHI,
PAKISTAN DESTINED FOR CHINA. EACH
CONTAINER WAS LATER IDENTIFIED TO
CONCEAL A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF HEROIN. (AGENT’S NOTE: THE
INVESTIGATION IS NOT RELATED TO THE NAWAB DTO, HOWEVER; IT
ILLUSTRATES A CONCEALMENT METHOD THAT THE NAWAB DTO MAY UTILIZE).
6. (SBU) BASED UPON THIS BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATED TO THE NAWAB
DTO, THE ICO BELIEVES THAT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT
THE PROBABILITY THAT NAWAB IS SHIPPING HEROIN CONCEALED IN SHIPPING
CONTAINERS TO ORGANIZATIONAL OR ASSOCIATED CRIMINAL GROUPS BASED IN
NAMPHO, NORTH KOREA. ADDITIONAL
WIRE INTERCEPTED CONVERSATIONS
INDICATED THAT NAWAB INFORMED AN UNKNOWN CALLER THAT A SHIPMENT IS
DESTINED FOR «FOB NIMPHO POT NORTH KOREA» (VERBATIM FROM THE
LINE
SHEETS). THE ICO INTERPRETED THIS
TO MEAN ‘FREIGHT ON BOARD NAMPHO
PORT, NORTH KOREA’. (AGENT’S
NOTE: THE CS INFORMED AGENTS THAT IF
NAWAB IS PURCHASING SHIPPING CONTAINERS THEN THERE EXISTS A HIGH
PROBABILITY THAT HE (NAWAB) IS USING THEM TO SUPPORT HIS HEROIN
TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY).
7. (SBU) THE WIRE INTERCEPTS HAVE ALSO IDENTIFIED OTHER PERTINENT
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN NAWAB AND HIS ASSOCIATE IDENTIFIED ONLY AS
ISLAMABAD 00002160 002 OF 002
YOUNAS. INTERCEPTED CONVERSATIONS
INDICATED THAT YOUNAS USES
TELEPHONE NUMBER, 861-348-650-0333.
ADDITIONAL WIRE INTERCEPTS
FURTHER IDENTIFIED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN NAWAB AND HIS ASSOCIATE
KNOWN ONLY AS MUHAMMAD JAN, WHO USES THE FOLLOWING UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES (UAE) PHONE NUMBER: 971-50-452-2615.
8. (SBU) NAWAB ALSO CONFERRED WITH UNKNOWN PERSONS (NO NUMBER
LISTED) ABOUT HAWALADARS GHAZI DIN AND HAJI AMIN, CONCERNING THE
ARRANGEMENT OF 30 LAC PAKISTAN RUPEES ($36,585.00 US).
ACTION REQUEST
9. (SBU) THE ICO REQUESTS THAT THE BEIJING COUNTRY OFFICE OBTAIN
TOLL AND SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON CHINESE TELEPHONE NUMBER,
861-348-650-0333 FOR THE TIME PERIOD JUNE 1, 2009 TO AUGUST 31,
2009. ADDITIONALLY, PLEASE
CONDUCT ALL CRIMINAL CHECKS ON THE
NUMBER AND INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NUMBER.
10. (SBU) THE ICO REQUESTS THAT THE DUBAI COUNTRY OFFICE OBTAIN TOLL
AND SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION ON UAE PHONE NUMBER, 971-50-452-2615 FOR
THE TIME PERIOD JUNE 1, 2009 TO AUGUST 31, 2009. ADDITIONALLY,
PLEASE CONDUCT ALL CRIMINAL CHECKS ON THE NUMBER AND INDIVIDUALS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE NUMBER.
11. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEA AGENTS MANUAL SECTION 6242.11,
THIS TELETYPE WAS PREPARED IN LIEU OF A DEA-6, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION.
12. (U) PLEASE DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THIS CABLE TO SA JOSEPH M. LABENBURG OR ACTING COUNTRY
ATTACH MICHAEL W. BROWN AT PHONE NUMBER 011-92-51-208-2747.
INDEXING
1. NAWAB, ARSHAD — NADDIS 6950391
— POSSIBLY SHIPPING CONTAINERS
WITH SUSPECTED
HEROIN FROM PAKISTAN TO THE
NAMPHO, NORTH KOREA
SEAPORT.
2. WARDAK, TARIQ — NADDIS 6970360
3. DIN, GHAZI — NADDIS
INCONCLUSIVE
— HAWALADAR MENTIONED IN AN
INTERCEPTED PHONE
CONVERSATION BETWEEN ARSHAD
NAWAB AND
UNKNOWN CALLER
4. AMIN, HAJI — NADDIS NEGATIVE
— HAWALADAR MENTIONED IN AN
INTERCEPTED PHONE
CONVERSATION BETWEEN ARSHAD
NAWAB AND
UNKNOWN CALLER
5. JAN, MUHAMMAD — NADDIS
INCONCLUSIVE
— UTILIZED PHONE NUMBER
971-504522615 TO CONTACT
ARSHAD NAWAB
PATTERSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 224417
date: 9/10/2009 11:17
refid: 09DUSHANBE1067
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2362
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1067 2531117
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101117Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0732
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1555
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001067
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/2019
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — REQUEST BY PRESIDENT RAHMON TO MEET WITH
SECRETARY CLINTON ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L. Quast, Deputy Chief of Mission, EXEC,
DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) On September 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for
North America and Europe Khusrav Nosiri gave PolEcon Chief a
diplomatic note, dated September 8, requesting a meeting between
President Rahmon and Secretary Clinton on the margins of UNGA
between September 22 and 25.
Nosiri said Rahmon would remain in
the United States only during these dates. Embassy supports
this meeting request, in light of Tajikistan’s growing
significance to our efforts in Afghanistan, and the importance
of personal contact in the Central Asian cultural and political
context.
2. (SBU) Following is the text of the note. Post requests
Department guidance on responding to this request:
Begin Text:
Complimentary Opening… and has the honor to announce that His
Excellency Emomali Rahomn, President of the Republic of
Tajikistan, will take part in the work of the 64th United
Nations General Assembly from 22 to 25 September, 2009 in New
York.
In connection with this, the Ministry would be grateful for the
organization of a meeting of His Excellency Emomali Rahmon with
Her Excellency Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State of the United
States.
Complementary Closing.
End Text.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 224649
date: 9/11/2009 11:12
refid: 09ISLAMABAD2199
origin: Embassy Islamabad
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3253
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHIL #2199/01 2541112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111112Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4448
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0842
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1221
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1881
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0422
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5443
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1155
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 1880
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002199
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ FOR: OC; OGE/ MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER, SULLIVAN, ROSPOND; OT/
SHROYER, OTF/ BROOKE; NIRE/ LEHRER, JACOBS; NTRE/ UPP; FOE; SARI;
SOD/HAMLETT, SOILES, EDDINGTON, MILIONE, OEMLER
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR RD DESTITO
AMEMBASSY KABUL FOR RD MARSAC
DEA SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION / SA MCINTOSH / SA WILSON
E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: RE-09-0010 / WGC1R /
LOPEZ, JAMES. DEA ISLAMABAD CO
RESPONSE TO DEA SEATTLE REQUEST FOR SUBSCRIBER AND TOLL INFORMATION
RELATED TO SEIZURE OF 10,000 SUSPECTED OXYCONTIN PILLS, ONE HAND
GUN, APPROXIMATELY 2,000,000 IRAQI DINAR AND THE ARREST OF TWO
SUBJECTS.
1. (SBU) REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE ELECTRONIC MAIL (EMAIL)
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SA JOHNSON, ISLAMABAD COUNTRY OFFICE (ICO)
AND SA BRENDA MCINOTOSH AND SA JACK WILSON OF THE SEATTLE DIVISION
OFFICE (SDO). THE EMAIL
CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINED TO AN ACTION
REQUEST FROM THE SDO REGARDING THE AFOREMENTIONED CASE FILE TITLE.
ON JULY 21, 2009 AND JULY 29, 2009, THE ICO PROVIDED AN OFFICIAL
LETTER TO THE ANTI-NARCOTICS FORCE/ SPECIAL INVESTIGATION CELL (SIC)
REQUESTING SUBSCRIBER AND TOLLS
INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING
TELEPHONE NUMBERS:
HOME PHONE: 92-21-223-3654
MOBILE PHONE: 92-323-263-6027
MOBILE PHONE: 92-323-211-2206
MOBILE PHONE: 92-322-275-1989
MOBILE PHONE: 92-303-225-6435
2. (SBU) ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2009, THE ICO RECEIVED THE REQUESTED
INFORMATION FROM ANF/SIC REGARDING THE AFOREMENTIONED NAMES AND
PHONE NUMBERS.
(AGENTS NOTE: ANF/SIC ONLY
PROVIDES SUBSCRIBER AND TOLL INFORMATION
UPON AN INITIAL REQUEST. ANF/SIC
IS ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILED
INFORMATION, SUCH AS THE TIMES AND DATES OF CALLS, IF REQUESTED.
UPON REVIEWING THIS CABLE, PLEASE ADVISE SA JOHNSON IF THAT
INFORMATION IS NEEDED).
THE RESULTS FROM SECTION 1 ARE AS FOLLOWS:
92-323-263-6027
PER ANF/SIC, THIS PHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF ASIF
MASHI, WITH NO ADDRESS INFORMATION PROVIDED. THE ABOVE NUMBER WAS
IN CONTACT WITH THE FOLLOWING PHONE NUMBERS, WITHIN AN UNKNOWN TIME
FRAME:
44795572479 43 (3 TIMES)
4479128448 15 (2 TIMES)
4477650211 24 (1 TIME)
4475989396 69 (49 TIMES)
4475361902 50 (2 TIMES)
4420858912 34 (2 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «UNITED KINGDOM»
1553282783 (1 TIME)
13232028579 (74 TIMES)
13104204267 (6 TIMES)
12058795011 (2 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «CANADA/USA»
6590197615 (53 TIMES)
6582494259 (13 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «SINGAPORE»
971559784810 (20 TIMES)
971502579851 (6 TIMES)
9715025798 (3 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)»
9144302140 84 (1 TIME)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «INDIA»
4792692634 (2 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «NORWAY»
92-323-211-2206
PER ANF/SIC, THIS PHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF MUHAMMAD
NAVEED, WITH NO ADDRESS INFORMATION PROVIDED. THE ABOVE NUMBER WAS
IN CONTACT WITH THE FOLLOWING PHONE NUMBERS, WITHIN AN UNKNOWN TIME
FRAME:
44795572479 43 (3 TIMES)
4479128448 15 (1 TIME)
4475989396 69 (13 TIMES)
ISLAMABAD 00002199 002 OF 003
SUBJECT: RE-09-0010 / WGC1R /
LOPEZ, JAMES. DEA ISLAMABAD CO
RESPONSE TO DEA SEATTLE REQUEST FOR SUBSCRIBER AND TOLL INFORMATION
RELATED TO SEIZURE OF 10,000 SUSPECTED OXYCONTIN PILLS, ONE HAND
GUN, APPROXIMATELY 2,000,000 IRAQI DINAR AND THE ARREST OF TWO
SUBJECTS.
4475361902 50 (5 TIMES)
4420858912 34 (1 TIME)
4479181384 89 (2 TIMES)
4475989396 (1 TIME)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «UNITED KINGDOM»
13232028579 (7 TIMES)
132334846666 (21 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «CANADA/USA»
6590197615 (34 TIMES)
6582494259 (4 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «SINGAPORE»
971559784810 (5 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)»
9665652461 69 (1 TIME)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «SAUDIA ARABIA»
2089020235 (3 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THIS NUMBER AS «EGYPT»
92-322-275-1989
PER ANF/SIC, THIS PHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF MOHAMMAD
SOHAIL, JAHANGIR ROAD, NEW TOWN F-140, KARACHI, PAKISTAN. THE ABOVE
NUMBER WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE FOLLOWING PHONE NUMBERS, WITHIN AN
UNKNOWN TIME FRAME:
17733382813 (5 TIMES)
17733382813 (5 TIMES)
ANF/SIC LISTED THESE NUMBERS AS «CANADA/USA»
92-303-225-6435
PER ANF/SIC, THIS PHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF MUHAMMAD
SHAFIQUE, BATANG JANOL BANDA, DISTRICT MANSHERA, PAKISTAN. NO TOLL
DATA WAS AVAILABLE.
92-21-223-3654
PER ANF/SIC, THIS PHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF MUHAMMAD
SALEEM, BILAL ARCADE, FLAT NO. A/403, 51/8, GRW GARDEN, KARACHI,
PAKISTAN. NO TOLL DATA WAS
AVAILABLE.
3. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
DEA AGENTS MANUAL SECTION
6242.11, THIS TELETYPE SERVES IN LIEU OF A DEA-6 REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION (ROI). PLEASE
DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS TO SA
JOHNSON OR ACTING DEA COUNTRY ATTACHE MICHAEL W. BROWN AT THE
ISLAMABAD COUNTRY OFFICE, 92-51-208-2344, OR VIA FIREBIRD.
INDEXING (SBU)
1. MASHI, ASIF NADDIS —
REGISTERED USER OF PAKISTAN
MOBILE PHONE NUMBER
92-323-263-6027.
2. NAVEED, MUHAMMAD NADDIS —
REGISTERED USER OF PAKISTAN
MOBILE PHONE NUMBER
92-323-211-2206.
3. SOHAIL, MOHAMMAD NADDIS —
REGISTERED USER OF PAKISTAN
MOBILE PHONE NUMBER
92-322-275-1989.
ADDRESS: JAHANGIR ROAD, NEW TOWN F-140, KARACHI,
PAKISTAN.
4. SHAFIQUE, MUHAMMAD NADDIS —
REGISTERED USER OF PAKISTAN
MOBILE PHONE NUMBER
92-322-8232290.
ADDRESS: FB AREA, H C 614, BLOCK 15, KARACHI,
PAKISTAN.
5. SALEEM, MUHAMMAD NADDIS — NEGATIVE
REGISTERED USER OF PAKISTAN
PHONE NUMBER 021-223-3654.
ADDRESS: BILAL ARCADE, FLAT NO. A/403, 51/8, GRW
GARDEN,
ISLAMABAD 00002199 003 OF 003
SUBJECT: RE-09-0010 / WGC1R /
LOPEZ, JAMES. DEA ISLAMABAD CO
RESPONSE TO DEA SEATTLE REQUEST FOR SUBSCRIBER AND TOLL INFORMATION
RELATED TO SEIZURE OF 10,000 SUSPECTED OXYCONTIN PILLS, ONE HAND
GUN, APPROXIMATELY 2,000,000 IRAQI DINAR AND THE ARREST OF TWO
SUBJECTS.
KARACHI, PAKISTAN.
PATTERSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 225076
date: 9/15/2009 5:09
refid: 09DUSHANBE1080
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09STATE864011
header:
VZCZCXRO5506
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1080/01 2580509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150509Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0739
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0232
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1576
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001080
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT FOR S/GPI MKWALKER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OEXC, PREL, SCUL, SMIG, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: IS THERE IS A TAJIK DIASPORA?
REF: STATE 864011
DUSHANBE 00001080 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Post provides responses
to reftel as follows:
A) To what extent are diasporans from your host country an
identifiable community? Are there
existing diaspora networks,
organizations or online communities available as platforms for
outreach?
— There are relatively few Tajiks from Tajikistan in the United
States, and they do not form a very large and cohesive
community. (Tajiks from
Afghanistan, by contrast, are more
organized along diasporic lines — for instance the Afghan
community centered in Fremont, California. Post is not aware of
any definitive study on the question, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that Tajiks from Tajikistan generally identify more and
feel more comfortable with other ex-Soviet Central Asians, even
those that are ethnically Turkic, than with Tajiks from
Afghanistan.) According to some
sources, the biggest single
enclave of Tajiks from Tajikistan is in Omaha, Nebraska, which
began forming as a result of an exchange program between the
University of Nebraska, Omaha, and Tajik Technological
University in the mid-1990s. Many
Tajiks stayed after
graduating and brought their families over. There is also a
sizable population of Afghans in Nebraska owing to a similar
exchange.
Bukharan Jews who grew up in Tajikistan, many of whom now live
in the United States, particularly in and around New York City,
might be considered a Tajik diaspora group. Most of
Tajikistan’s small Jewish community emigrated during the Soviet
period. In recent years a couple
of small delegations of
Bukharan Jews have visited Tajikistan to explore economic
opportunities and to support closer ties between the United
States and Tajikistan.
In contrast to their relatively small and fragmented presence in
America, Tajiks form a very large community in Russia.
According to some estimates, as many as a million Tajiks (out of
a total country population of seven million) work in Russia as
labor migrants. While many of
these Tajiks are seasonal
migrants, and thus perhaps not diasporans per se, there is
evidence suggesting that more Tajiks are staying for longer
periods of time, partly in response to the global financial
crisis. Tajiks in Russia identify
more strongly as a community,
and have mobilized collectively in many cases. For example,
recently there have been protests by Tajiks over unpaid wages in
several Russian cities.
Mobilization and identification have
been supported by the fact that many Tajiks in Russia are
employed in just a few economic sectors, particularly
construction and services.
B) What is the nature of the connection of the diaspora
community to the host country?
Examples include kinship
networks; educational or other institutional ties; financial
support as from remittances; and direct participation in
community or country affairs and civil society.
— The Tajik economy is extremely dependent on Tajiks working
abroad, particularly in Russia.
Tajiks sent home nearly $2.7
billion in remittances last year.
According to survey research,
the majority of Tajik families have at least one member (almost
always male, but sometimes female) working in Russia. Indeed,
there are some rural communities in Tajikistan that have almost
no working-age males, since all are abroad. Most Tajiks in
Russia maintain close ties with their families in Tajikistan,
and many of them come home during the winters when seasonal work
in Russia drops off.
As noted above, more Tajiks appear to be staying for longer
periods in Russia. The continuous
rise in remittances over the
past six years suggests that their ties remain strong to
Tajikistan, however. Remittances
declined for the first time in
2009, as a result of the world financial crisis. Evidence
suggests that many Tajiks are hoping to wait the crisis out in
Russia.
According to IMF figures, the U.S (with 6%) and Germany (with
2%) are next largest sources of remittances to Tajikistan.
Although there are relatively few Tajiks in these countries,
they tend to be skilled professionals and their per capita
remittances are much higher than average.
C) To what extent has your host country or government activated
its diaspora communities for humanitarian relief? How would you
characterize the level of response?
If outreach is relatively
recent, do you foresee opportunities to maintain diaspora
community involvement in country over the long term?
DUSHANBE 00001080 002.2 OF 004
— The Tajik diaspora has made the difference between economic
survival and cataclysm for many Tajik families. During the
brutal winter of 2007-08, when temperatures plunged to record
lows while food and heating prices rose precipitously, most
experts believe that systemic crisis was averted only by virtue
of a sharp increase in remittances from family members working
in Russia. While the government
has certainly been aware of the
huge importance of remittances, it has made little effort to
organize or mobilize the activity of Tajiks working abroad.
Most guestworkers continue to maintain active ties directly with
their families, through money transfers and seasonal visits, and
their activity has not been mediated by the state.
D) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in long-term
investment in country, for example micro-enterprise development,
job creation, entrepreneurship, and institutional capacity
building? What is post’s
assessment of the future potential for
long-term and sustained engagement of the diaspora community in
such efforts?
— The Tajik diaspora community — whether in Russia or
elsewhere — has not engaged in much self-conscious
«development» work in Tajikistan. For the most part, Tajiks
send money home with the sole goal of assisting their families.
While many of the domestic elite have had experience working
abroad (some in the upper echelons have worked in the West),
with a very few exceptions there is no sense that Tajiks from
abroad have returned home to assist their country.
As noted above, there are very few Tajiks working in the United
States, and there is thus little opportunity to engage Tajiks in
America in development efforts.
E) To what extent is the diaspora community working toward
scientific, engineering, medical and educational institution
building? How might diasporans with
backgrounds in these fields
or otherwise affiliated with the Academy, or professional and
technical societies, become engaged in science diplomacy
programs?
— There is very little diaspora involvement in these areas.
The few Tajiks who gain advanced technical ability in Tajikistan
or abroad tend to seek jobs abroad, and often to emigrate. This
has in fact been a problem in retaining highly qualified embassy
staff. Post is aware of very few
Tajiks who have moved in the
other direction.
Tajikistan’s lone private university, the Institute of Technical
Innovations and Communications (ITIC), was set up by Tajik-born
U.S. citizen Sadriddin Akramov.
ITIC has angered authorities by
employing outspoken critics of the government. The Ministry of
Education recently issued an order forbidding the university
from opening for classes on September 1, but ITIC ignored the
order. Akramov and the Ministry
are engaged in an ongoing court
battle.
F) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in conflict
resolution and peace building? Do
you see future potential to
translate diaspora community participation in these processes
into other priorities governing the bilateral (and/or regional)
relationship?
— There is very little engagement in this area. On the
contrary, some Tajiks based in Russia are involved in opposition
politics and media.
G) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in meeting
the health, education and welfare needs of indigenous peoples?
— For the most part, there is little engagement in this area.
The work of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) might be
considered the one notable exception.
Run by the Prince Karim
Al Husseini, the Ismaili Aga Khan, the AKDN and its partner
organizations are involved in a number of humanitarian and
development projects in Tajikistan.
While many of these are
broad-based, the Aga Khan has concentrated much of its work in
the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, which has a
predominantly Ismaili population.
H) To what extent is the diaspora community engaged in democracy
promotion, electoral reform and civil society development? Are
there key milestones in your host country or host government’s
development that would create opportunities for such engagement
in the future?
— Given the Tajik government’s aversion to genuine democratic
processes, there would appear to be some potential in this area.
The embassy has worked to harness
this through exchange
DUSHANBE 00001080 003.2 OF 004
programs that offer Tajiks the chance to engage with
counterparts in America. High
school exchanges, international
visitors’ leadership programs, and professional exchanges for
experts in various fields give Tajiks the chance to experience
democratic institutions and practices.
Many of these Tajiks,
upon returning home, act as important sources of information for
their colleagues, friends, and family.
The relatively small
numbers of Tajiks who have experienced such programs, however,
have so far had little effect on the vast democratic challenges
facing Tajikistan.
I) How would you characterize the level of concern and attention
given to diaspora communities by your host government? If
applicable, please describe the host government’s organization
and strategy dedicated to relationship-building with its
diaspora communities. For
example, host governments may have
established promotion offices to encourage diasporans’ return,
bringing with them know-how and financial resources.
— The government of Tajikistan is deeply concerned with the
welfare of the Tajik diaspora because the country is so reliant
on the money sent home by Tajiks working abroad. (Indeed, some
say the government gets away with spending less per capita on
education and health than almost anywhere else in the world
because remittances to Tajikistan are higher than anywhere else
in the world — equivalent to 52% of GDP in 2008.) Far from
encouraging Tajiks to return home, the government has rather
been working to make sure Tajiks can remain abroad. In the wake
of the financial crisis it has made some efforts to train
returning Tajiks for domestic jobs, but these efforts remain
largely on paper. The government
has been more active in
defending (if only rhetorically) the rights of Tajiks in Russia
who have been victims of discrimination or violence. One of the
sharpest diplomatic incidents to occur between Tajikistan and
Russia followed the murder of a Tajik guestworker last winter.
The Republic of Tajikistan has also been seeking out new labor
markets for its citizens, particularly in the Middle East.
J) If post has undertaken programs to reach out proactively to
diaspora community members, please share the circumstances that
prompted the outreach effort, how outreach was conducted or
programmed, personal impressions from the experience, and
benefits from the outreach effort.
— Post works with a very active network of alumni from exchange
programs with the United States.
These alumni have worked
together to promote charity events, brief visiting U.S.
dignitaries and policy makers, and contribute formally and
informally to post’s reporting on economic, social, and
political events in Tajikistan.
There is no organized effort to
reach Tajiks who have worked in Russia, although given their
prevalence post encounters such individuals daily.
K) If post has received unsolicited requests from the diaspora
community, please share the nature the requests, the
considerations post took into account in formulating respective
responses, and the outcomes of interaction.
— Post has received no such requests to date.
L) To what extent has post designed or participated in public
diplomacy programs customized to diaspora community needs and
interests? Does post anticipate
taking advantage of such
opportunities in the future? (Ref. A is one example.)
— See response to J, above.
M) In planning future programs and anticipating requests for
assistance from diaspora community actors, what types of
knowledge management tools and information materials would be
most helpful to action officers at post?
If the Department were
to develop a reach-back program to academics in the field of
diaspora community engagement, what are post’s preferences for
accessing such a mechanism?
— Given the immense challenges facing Tajikistan, one of the
poorest and least-developed countries in Asia, there is
certainly opportunity to engage diaspora communities in
providing assistance here. But
there are numerous challenges:
the very small numbers of Tajiks in the west with the skills,
education, and resources to provide assistance; the tendency of
those few Tajiks who do develop advanced skills domestically to
emigrate; the concern of most Tajik guestworkers with the raw
fundamentals of life — putting food on the tables of their
families, rather than engaging in broader development efforts;
and the government’s poor business and investment climate, which
acts as a disincentive for Tajiks (or others) interested in
development, whether for profit or not.
Post is ready and
DUSHANBE 00001080 004.2 OF 004
willing to work with the Department to engage the diaspora
community to the extent these challenges can be overcome.
2. (U) Point of contact at
Embassy Dushanbe is Economic Officer
Daniel Kronenfeld.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 225165
date: 9/15/2009 12:39
refid: 09DUSHANBE1088
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09STATE95019
header:
VZCZCXRO5883
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1088 2581239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151239Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0753
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0246
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0161
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0124
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0083
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1600
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001088
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, NATO, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — DEMARCHE ON AFGHAN ELECTIONS
REF: STATE 95019
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L. Quast, DCM, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) On September 15 PolEcon Chief delivered reftel demarche
to Dodhudo Pirov, Director of Asian and African Affairs at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Pirov said the Government of
Tajikistan well understood that the electoral process in
Afghanistan was not finished, and that there could be a second
round of voting. Tajikistan would
respect this process, and not
take any actions to prejudge the results of the process, Pirov
said.
2. (C) Ambassador will also convey this demarche when he makes
his initial call on the Foreign Minister, scheduled for
September 18, and will likewise raise it with President Rahmon
when he presents his credentials (date TBD). Post will report
any further substantive reaction septel.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
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date: 9/16/2009 12:51
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origin: Embassy Islamabad
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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