id: 101083
date: 3/20/2007 7:47
refid: 07DUSHANBE376
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9853
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0376/01 0790747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200747Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9810
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2016
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2053
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2025
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1447
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000376
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK GOVERNMENT RETAINS STRONG CONTROL OVER ISLAMIC
LEADERS
CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
Mufti Domulloh Khudoyberdi of Tajikistan’s
Council of Ulamo called PolOff to his office March 16 to retract
his statements during a meeting with the Ambassador and visiting
U.S. OSCE Ambassador Julie Finley March 7. The Mufti explained
that he would like to convey additional information to the
Embassy, but at the time he was unable to share openly and
truthfully his opinions fearing his words would be relayed to
the government. END SUMMARY.
COUNCIL OF ULAMO ISSUES STANDARDIZED SERMON
2. (C) As Tajikistan’s head Mufti, Khudoyberdi
expressed his
grave concern about the limits on practicing Islam in
Tajikistan, including the influence of the Council of Ulamo,
which serves as an advisory body for Tajikistan’s Islamic
community. The Chairman of the
Council of Ulamo, Amanullo
Nematzoda, recently passed out a draft sermon to be distributed
to imams across Tajikistan. The
Council will instruct imams to
preach from the sermon and not to deviate too far from its
message. Khudoyberdi repeatedly
expressed disappointment with
Nematzoda whom he touted as a government stooge with no
scholarly Islamic background.
Khudoyberdi suspects the chairman
did not draft the sermon himself, but rather the government
ordered him to disseminate the draft sermon as the puppet leader
of the religious Muslim community
MUFTI ADMITS FATWA WAS WRONG
3. (C) Khudoyberdi also criticized the Nematzoda for
issuing
the 2004 fatwa prohibiting women from praying in mosques, even
in areas separated from men. In
the March 7 meeting with
Ambassadors Finley and Jacobson, Khudoyberdi explained that the
reasoning behind the fatwa was because in Tajikistan,
traditionally, women had never gone to the mosques to pray and
the Koran does not say that women should pray in mosques. On
March 16, the Mufti apologized for his stock answers that all
imams relay. He explained that he
actually would like to see
more women attend mosque because they are the caretakers and
teachers of Tajikistan’s children and are influential in shaping
the next generation’s perspective.
The Islamic Renaissance
Party of Tajikistan defied the fatwa and has established a
mosque where women can also pray.
Although Khudoyberdi is in
favor of women praying in mosques, as long as the present
Chairman remains in power, the Council of Ulamo is not in a
position to defy the government, which pushed the Council to
issue the fatwa.
SECULAR EDUCATION IN ISLAMIC SCHOOLS
4. (C) The revamping of the curriculum in Islamic
schools
represents a new development in Tajikistan’s Islamic community.
According to media reports, a pilot project funded by the Swiss
Cooperation Office will set up a new curriculum with secular
courses that will better educate madrassah students and Islamic
University graduates and empower them to be more competitive in
the job market. (COMMENT: The new curriculum’s influence
remains to be seen. Although any
increase in secular education
is a benefit to Tajikistan, this could also serve as a way for
the government to dilute religious education. In turn, a weak
system of religious education could drive young people to seek
religion elsewhere. END
COMMENT.) Khudoyberdi was
disappointed at the state of religious education in Tajikistan
and admitted that the Islamic University churns out unqualified
students. He pointed out that
like other higher education
institutions, the standards are low and teachers untrained.
A NON-INDEPENDENT MOSQUE
5. (C) Khudoyberdi began the meeting by advising
PolOff never
to schedule a meeting with more than one Tajik interlocutor at a
time. Khudoyberdi explained that
if there is more than one
Tajik in the room, one of them may be a National Committee for
State Security agent. Even if no
one in the room is truly from
the National Committee for State Security, participants will
still refrain from speaking out against the power structure in
fear that their words would leak out.
Khudoyberdi revealed that
every Friday the National Committee for State Security (formerly
the Ministry of Security and still referred to as the Soviet
name «KGB») would send an official to survey the worshippers
at
Dushanbe’s Central Mosque and report suspicious activity.
6. (C) Khudoyberdi admitted that he no longer
worries about
government retribution. If the
government dismisses him from
his position as Tajikistan’s Mufti and revokes his pension, he
DUSHANBE 00000376 002 OF 002
is confident that the community will take care of him
financially. As a younger man, he
would not have dared to speak
out against the government, but he has nothing to lose in his
old age and as a devout religious leader, mourns the
deterioration of Islam in Tajikistan.
7. (C) COMMENT:
Khudoyberdi’s revealing comments confirm the
government’s continuing watchful eye on Islamic activities in
Tajikistan. Police still round
up children found in mosques
when they should be in school.
Officials shut down unregistered
mosques. Although the
government’s activities are based on
attempts to curb extremism, its heavy-handedness and strict
control of Islamic activity not only infringes on freedom of
religion, but may also further drive people towards
non-traditional, and more extreme, Islamic groups. The
government fears Islamic radicalism, and little hope exists that
it will loosen its surveillance or control on Tajikistan’s
practicing Muslims. END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 101148
date: 3/20/2007 12:17
refid: 07DUSHANBE381
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE199
header:
VZCZCXRO0121
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0381/01 0791217
ZNR UUUUU
P R 201217Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000381
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
SCA FOR CEN;
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENGR, EAID, TI, AF
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LIGHTS OUT AND EVERYONE HOME-AND COLD
REF: DUSHANBE 199
DUSHANBE 00000381 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) SUMMARY: Even as Tajikistan seeks to become a regional
energy exporter, most of Dushanbe has had only four to six hours
of power each day for the last month.
Many parts of rural
Tajikistan have remained without any electricity throughout the
winter, but the fact that the capital is experiencing severe
power rationing and shortages underscores how desperately
Tajikistan’s state-owned power utility Barqi Tojik needs to
reform. Although generation
projects under construction — such
as the 670 megawatt Sangtuda-I hydropower station scheduled to
go on line in Spring 2008 — will eventually alleviate some of
the shortages, without a real overhaul of the entire electricity
system, Tajik citizens will remain in the dark.
2. (SBU) COMMENT:
In addition to World Bank and Asian
Development Bank technical assistance projects, USAID’s Regional
Energy Markets Assistance Program is working to reform
Tajikistan’s ailing electricity system and establish a
competitive and transparent electricity market. However, it
will take political will as much as technical assistance to
ensure that Tajiks get reliable power.
Further, if Tajikistan
does indeed start exporting electricity to Afghanistan and
Pakistan under the proposed Central Asia South Asia Regional
Electricity Market (CASAREM) project, without ensuring its own
citizens have adequate light and heat, President Rahmonov may
finally face an angry populace tired of being left in the cold.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
3. (U) Since mid-February, most parts of Dushanbe
only have
electricity from approximately 6 am to 8 am and 5 pm to 10 pm,
and some areas go 24 — 48 hours without any power. Downtown,
home to many government offices and President Rahmonov and his
family, remains lit, but government offices in outlying areas,
such as the Tax Committee, suffer as much as ordinary residents.
The Deputy Head of the Tax
Committee — Tajikistan’s equivalent
of the Internal Revenue Service — told PolOffs he rushes to the
office to print out work between 7 and 8 am and then goes home
because there is nothing else to do in the cold building.
4. (U) The problem extends
throughout the country. In Sughd
province in the north, and Khatlon in the southeast, electricity
comes for an hour in the morning and an hour in the evening.
The Pamir region Gorno-Badakhshan, which last year was the only
region to have winter electricity full time, is still reeling
from the effects of the February accident at the Pamir-I power
station and has only limited hours of electricity distribution
(Reftel). Press reports have
noted that Takistan’s biggest
enterprise, Tajik Aluminum, has cut its production by two-thirds
in response to the electricity shortage.
5. (U) In addition to an
inefficient distribution system, the
shortages stem both from a lower level of water in Tajikistan’s
biggest reservoir Nurek, and lower than usual winter energy
imports from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Desperate Tajik energy
representatives met with Uzbek counterparts several times this
winter to increase energy inputs to little avail. Demand has
also grown-as the old centralized steam heating systems no
longer work, many residents try to heat their apartments with
small electric or kerosene heaters, despite the inefficiency of
heating individual units in large cement block buildings. The
government has predicted the shortage will continue a few more
weeks, until the water level in Nurek goes up and warmer
temperatures reduce demand for home heating.
6. (U) Normally unwilling to
confront the government, Dushanbe
residents raise their hands and shrug in response to the
inconvenience. However, contacts
have told EmbOffs that in
southern Farkhor district angry residents burned goods in a
cotton cleaning factory to protest the fact that the factory has
electricity, while the town went without. Other rumors report
that citizens in Voseh district publicly tore up a picture of
President Rahmonov, and clashed with the local police in Kulyob
over the electricity rations.
7. (SBU) COMMENT.
Tajiks somewhat blame Uzbekistan for the
energy shortages, but mostly the Tajik government for its
inability to harness Tajikistan’s massive hydro resource
potential. Tajik contacts
regularly tell EmbOffs that they
expect the government to resolve these electricity issues in the
next year or two. Continued power
shortages have the potential
to threaten the delicate stability within Tajikistan. END
COMMENT.
DUSHANBE 00000381 002.2 OF 002
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 101939
date: 3/26/2007 12:20
refid: 07ASHGABAT317
origin: Embassy Ashgabat
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06ASHGABAT450
header:
VZCZCXRO5384
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0317/01 0851220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261220Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8566
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0671
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0725
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1928
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0229
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0251
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/HSE/CCJ5//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/RUE//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/REA/NMJIC-J2//
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000317
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY), SCA/PPD, SCA/A; ASTANA PASS TO USAID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, EAID, AF, TX, UZ, TI, IR
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN, AFGHANISTAN TO EXPAND ELECTRICITY TRADE
Ref: 06 Ashgabat 450
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Please handle
accordingly. Not
for public Internet.
2. (U) SUMMARY: USAID-Kabul’s power team concluded an
«understanding» March 23 in Ashgabat that is likely to lead to
Turkmenistan providing northwest Afghanistan (initially) a regular
supply of electricity from the gas-fired plant at Serdar. However,
sooner rather than later, Turkmenistan will need help to understand
and implement legal requirements for contracts in international
markets. END SUMMARY.
3. (U) Acting Charge met with
USAID/Kabul-contracted energy trade
specialist Ramses Khalil and members of his team March 23. Also
present were Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Turkmenistan, and
Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Mines and Industries Mir Sediq.
NORTH EAST POWER SYSTEM (NEPS) PROJECT
4. (U) The USAID team came to
Turkmenistan to discuss electricity
trade and transit issues with the Ministry of Energy and Industry of
Turkmenistan as part of the North East Power System (NEPS) Project.
NEPS is an Afghan government initiative and multi-donor project
consisting of generation, transmission, and distribution, which will
combine imported power with domestically generated power for
Afghanistan. NEPS seeks
electricity exports from Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
EXISTING POWER LINES AND CAPACITY
5. (U) Currently, two
high-voltage lines run from Turkmenistan to
Afghanistan. The first, from Mary
(in Turkmenistan) to Herat, is
designed for 220 kilovolts (kV), but operates at 110 kV. Built
three years ago to deliver electricity to Afghanistan, the line is
still in good condition and can probably be converted to a 220 kV
line in two to five years. The
other line, 110 kV, runs from
Turkmenistan to Andkhoy and electrifies the majority of Afghanistan
around Andkhoy. A third line,
still to be constructed, would run
from Mary to Tagtabazar to Marcik.
6. (U) According to the USAID
contractors, Turkmenistan is
producing 3,200 megawatts (MWs) of power a year. Given
Turkmenistan’s political decision to cut the flow of power to
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has an excess of power from its gas-fired
power plant in Serdar, near Turkmenabat, which, even during summer
peaks, amounts to about 2,200 MW.
The USAID team has validated that
Turkmenistan, which has more excess power than either Uzbekistan or
Tajikistan, has both the capacity and will to sell the 300 MW of
electricity Afghanistan currently seeks.
TURKMENISTAN’S PROPOSAL
7. (SBU) During the USAID team’s
most recent visit, the Government
of Turkmenistan proposed to supply power to Afghanistan through a
500 kV high-power line that it would build from the Serdar power
plant to the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border at Sheberghan;
Afghanistan would then build the lines from the border to
Sheberghan, to Mazar-e-Sharif, and onwards. The Government of
Turkmenistan would fully fund the 400-kilometer line within
Turkmenistan at a cost of approximately $200,000 per kilometer.
However, Turkmenistan stated that it did not want the 500-to-220 kW
step-down transmission sub-station, which would cost an additional
$30-40 million to build, on its side of the border. (Note:
According to Khalil, USAID was willing to consider building the line
from Sheberghan to the Turkmenistani border and possibly the
step-down substation. End
Note.) Khalil estimated that, once all
the paperwork was signed, the Turkmenistan segment of the line would
take about 18 months to complete.
If built, such a line would
satisfy the current Afghanistan power demand.
EVENTUAL POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT?
8. (SBU) Khalil informed Embassy
that, during his visit, the two
sides had not discussed concrete terms, although Turkmenistan had
said it was agreeable in principle to a long-term power purchase
agreement (PPA). The USAID team
had left an executive summary,
ASHGABAT 00000317 002 OF 002
which could become the basis for a PPA, but Turkmenistan had refused
to sign an «agreement.»
Khalil and his team left with a two-page
«protocol» that he believed could be agreed to in about two
months.
OTHER NEIGHBORS AND PROJECTS
9. (SBU) Khalil said Afghanistan
sees Turkmenistan as currently the
most reliable partner from which to purchase electricity. He
characterized Tajikistan potentially a good partner but currently
«over-promising» because Tajikistan will not be able to
provide a
regular flow of electricity until Sangtuda-2 and, probably, Rogun
dams and power stations are completed — «10-12 years from now.» For
the same reason, Khalil implied, the recent
Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran announced agreement for a high-tension
line from Tajikistan across Afghanistan to Iran is decidedly much
less than meets the eye.
10. (SBU) COMMENT: Turkmenistan can be a reliable source of
electricity for northwest Afghanistan, and eventually further afield
in Afghanistan, because of the reliable supply from gas-fired power
plants. Sooner rather than later,
Turkmenistan will need help to
understand and implement legal requirements for contracts in the
international market. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102276
date: 3/28/2007 11:35
refid: 07DUSHANBE430
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7541
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0430/01 0871135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281135Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9878
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1972
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1946
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1872
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1191
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1517
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2056
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2019
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1806
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0150
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2028
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1606
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1625
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1776
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1930
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1412
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0149
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000430
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EIND, EINV, ETRD, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TELECOM IN TAJIKISTAN: SCENE-SETTER FOR USTDA CONFERENCE IN
ALMATY
DUSHANBE 00000430 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. While Tajikistan’s presence at the upcoming
US Trade and Development Agency Telecommmunications Conference
in Almaty will be thin, the vibrant and competitive Tajik
telecom sector continues to attract both consumers and foreign
investment. Nine major companies
serve approximately 800,000
mobile customers throughout the republic. Success brings
unwanted attention as well — President Rahmonov capriciously
decided to tax telecom companies on the importation of
equipment; and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
has plans to create a single gateway to control digital traffic.
The government-owned land-based
monopoly Tajik Telecom
struggles to keep up, despite official market interference.
Undeterred, the entrepreneurial Tajik cellular phone operators
debate pricing structures and «third generation» technology.
END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) The Tajik Ministry of
Transportation and
Communications is unlikely to play an active role at the April
3-5 conference in Almaty.
Abdurahim Ashurov, head of the newly
combined Ministry and former Minister of Transportation, leaves
telecommunications issues to his deputy, Beg Zuhurov. Post
actively sought Zuhurov’s participation in the conference, but
presidential administration reticence to allow travel by any
high-level ministerial personnel halted this opportunity. In
his stead, Nurinisso Boboeva, the Soviet-thinking head of the
Ministry’s International Department, will attend, along with
Rahmonali Hasanov, General Director of Tajik Telecom, and Anora
Zakirova, Director of the Agency of Communication Regulations.
No private Tajik telecom operators plan on attending, due to a
lack of understanding of how the conference might help them.
3. (U) Major improvements in the country’s
telecommunications
infrastructure continue, however.
According to recent news
reports, Kazakh Telecom is opening a representative office in
Dushanbe for the purpose of installing a fiber-optic network
connecting Kazakhstan and Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan,
potentially extending to Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Comment:
Ironically, this occurred on the same day that Kazakh Air
indefinitely cancelled its Almaty-Dushanbe flight. One step
forward, two steps back. End
Comment.) Under an agreement
signed in December 2006, China Development Bank will provide a
$73 million long-term loan to improve telecommunications
services in Tajikistan. The loan
will be used to purchase
modern equipment for TK-Mobile and Tajik Telecom. The European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development is supporting
modernization of the country’s telecommunications network
through investment in new digital switching and transmission
equipment in Dushanbe and regional centers.
4. (U) Foreign direct investment drives the
development of
telecommunications services in Tajikistan through joint
ventures. The leading companies
include: Indigo Somoncom,
Indigo Tajikistan, and Skytel — U.S.-Tajik joint ventures;
TK-Mobile and M-Teko with China; and Beeline and MegaFon with
Russia. The sprawling Tajik
system functions on several
standards, including GSM, AMPS, CDMA450, CDMA20001X, 3G-UMTS and
3G. A liberal mobile licensing
policy and comparatively low
market entrance cost have driven the rapid growth of cellular
operators and related competition between wireless standards.
Other contributing factors include the low penetration rates in
both fixed-line and mobile communications, and the rapid growth
in disposable income.
5. (U) An active telecom association regularly
brings
together the heads of the Tajik cellular operators to discuss
pricing plans, government interference, and interoperability.
Operating within a culturally suitable brand of communal
capitalism, cellular companies set standard prices for
DUSHANBE 00000430 002.2 OF 002
connecting with each other. At an
Embassy-hosted telecom lunch
February 21, EconOffs listened as all the major operators
discussed moving away from the «Receiving Party Pays» and
«Mobile Party Pays» models to the «Calling Party
Pays» model,
which would make landline phone users pay for connecting with
cellular customers.
6. (U) As revenues in the telecom sector in 2006
approached
$70 million, the Tajik government moved to clamp down on the
industry by creating a Unified Communication Center. The center
would make all calls flow through a centralized system, allowing
the Ministry of Interior or other secuirty services to monitor
telephone calls, and supposedly increasing tax revenues.
Starting in early 2006, the cellular operators have vehemently
opposed reducing the efficiency of the network while removing
their customers’ protections. The
government backed off, but
has not entirely abandoned its goals to control more tightly the
flow of information — and revenue.
7. (SBU) Comment: Despite the absence of top telecom-policy
makers, post believes the Almaty conference will provide the
Tajik officials a more Western-oriented viewpoint on regulating
the telecommunications industry, something sorely needed in a
Soviet-minded bureaucracy that is not yet part of the
information age. Meanwhile, the
enormous potential for
expansion makes telecom one of Tajikistan’s few appealing
investment sectors. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102453
date: 3/29/2007 11:50
refid: 07DUSHANBE433
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1425|06DUSHANBE804
header:
VZCZCXRO8776
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0433/01 0881150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 291150Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9886
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2030
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2058
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2021
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1414
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1932
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1948
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1808
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1608
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1874
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1974
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1627
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1193
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1525
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000433
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/29/2027
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: NDI IN TAJIKISTAN: A GLIMMER OF HOPE?
REF: A) 06 DUSHANBE 804 B) 06
DUSHANBE 1425
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) Summary:
After getting the cold shoulder from the
Ministry of Justice, National Democratic Institute (NDI)
received an encouraging sign from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister
Saidmuddin Yatimov suggested
that a visa for National Democratic Institute Tajikistan
Director-designate Harry Bader «should not be a problem.»
Yatimov did not specify whether it would be a work visa, which
means National Democratic Institute could still encounter the
catch-22 that Tajikistan will not
issue a work visa unless
someone is working for a registered organization-and the
Ministry of Justice has given no indication it will register the
organization any time soon.
However, even the possibility of a
visa for an American director represents a small step forward
and post will continue to work with Bader through the
application process. End Summary.
POUNDING THE PAVEMENT
2. (C) Back in Tajikistan March
26-29 to make another run at
the Tajik government on registering National Democratic
Institute, Senior Advisor Laura Jewett and National Democratic
Institute Ukraine Program Officer (and Tajikistan
director-designate) Harry Bader tried to make the rounds of
government ministries with limited success. The Minister of
Interior Mahmadnazar Solehov met with Jewett, Bader and the
Ambassador March 27, but had little response other than to thank
the organization for its openness and support of Tajikistan.
3. (C) Minister of Justice Bakhtiar Khudoerov
refused to meet
with National Democratic Institute or allow any of his deputies
to represent him. In her
long-awaited courtesy call March 28
(more than three months after he assumed his post), the
Ambassador pressed Khudoerov five times for an opportunity for
National Democratic Institute to meet with someone at the
Ministry of Justice, to no avail.
In response to the argument
that National Democratic Institute closing its doors would be a
black mark on Tajikistan’s reputation, Khudoerov noted that 90
international non-governmental organizations, including 35 from
the United States, were active in Tajikistan. The minister
shrugged off the Ambassador’s point that National Democratic
Institute was a well-respected organization operating across the
former Soviet Union, including in Russia and Uzbekistan, and it
garnered special attention in Washington and in the U.S.
congress.
YOU’RE KIDDING, RIGHT?
4. (C) Standing in for Foreign
Minister Zaripov, who was
attending an European Union-sponsored ministerial meeting in
Almaty, Yatimov told Bader, PolOff and Senior Advisor Laura
Jewett March 28 that although the Ministry of Justice controlled
the registration process, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could
provide support by issuing a visa for Bader to come to
Tajikistan. He stated that both
he and Minister Zaripov-the
former Ambassador to Washington-understood the importance of
building civil society and the role non-governmental
organizations could play in helping Tajikistan achieve security.
Yatimov encouraged Bader to apply
for his visa.
5. (C) Yatimov explained that in anticipation of the
meeting,
he had contacted the Ministry of Justice about the registration
issue, but was unable to get a «real answer» as to why
National
Democratic Institute could not register.
He said the Ministry
of Justice had been ready to register National Democratic
Institute, but then the charges against acting director Nurul
Rakhimbekov (reftel A) and his hasty departure in April 2006
called into question the «morality» of the organization’s
leadership and activities.
Yatimov repeated many of the
government accusations made against Rakhimbekov-misuse of
DUSHANBE 00000433 002 OF 002
vehicles, sleeping with minors and/or prostitutes — and noted
that National Democratic Institute must be careful to respect
the laws of a country, and not appear «immoral.» Yatimov said
he would meet with the Ministry of Justice in a week to try to
get a more clear answer about the registration issue.
GOOD NEWS~
6. (C) Yatimov acknowledged that if National
Democratic
Institute was to stop working in Tajikistan, it would «create a
negative image» about the country and those investments would
not come to a country perceived as «not democratic.» «We cannot
move forward the goals of our foreign policy without
organizations like yours.»
BAD NEWS~
7. (C) However, he cautioned
Jewett and Bader that
non-governmental organizations «must not play with the stability
of Tajikistan» by encouraging Islamic fundamentalism, «like
the
Islamic Renaissance Party.»
He warned them to be «very careful»
about creating an opposition, or «working against the law.»
Jewett and Bader noted that National Democratic Institute worked
with all parties to support pluralism, but would certainly
respect the law.
A SMALL BREAKTHROUGH
7. (C) Comment:
Yatimov proved surprisingly well-informed and
engaged on National Democratic Institute’s cause and the
long-term implications for democratic stability and attracting
Western investment. His inability
to get a satisfactory answer
from the Ministry of Justice indicates that more than technical
reasons stand behind the refusal to register the organization,
and gives further evidence to suspicions that the Tajik
government is split ideologically on how to handle
non-governmental organizations in general, and National
Democratic Institute in particular.
Yatimov’s comments about
the Islamic Renaissance Party suggest that although the Tajik
government understands the pressure to embrace democracy, there
is a great deal of discomfort with allowing certain parties to
operate.
8. (C) If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does issue
a work
visa, it will be a remarkable -and hard-won — opportunity for
National Democratic Institute to re-establish itself and work
towards full registration with the Ministry of Justice. It is
possible, however, that because National Democratic Institute is
not a registered organization, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
cannot issue a work visa and will only issue a visitor visa.
This was the fate of the last American director who departed in
2005 and could render it impossible for Bader to conduct any
work activity, leaving National Democratic Institute in the
exact limbo it is in now.
7. (C) The wild card, and possible trump card,
remains the
State Committee on National Security, aka «the KGB.»
Rakhimbekov maintained that the then-Ministry of Security held
him for four days, asked nothing about the charges, but
repeatedly questioned him about National Democratic Institute’s
activities. The security
authorities remain spooked by the
«color revolutions» in Ukraine and Georgia, and the constant
unrest in Kyrgyzstan, and may do everything in their power to
ensure that U.S.-funded democracy-focused organizations cannot
function in Tajikistan. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102616
date: 3/30/2007 12:59
refid: 07DUSHANBE443
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE368
header:
VZCZCXRO0093
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0443/01 0891259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301259Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9897
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2032
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1934
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1416
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1540
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000443
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN KICKS OUT FAITH-BASED NGO’S EXPAT STAFF
REF: DUSHANBE 368
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular
Department
Chief Bahrom Kholnazarov summoned Paul Linge, Country Director
of Operation Mercy, March 29 to inform him that Operation
Mercy’s foreign, non-Tajik, staff would have to leave Tajikistan
within ten days. Kholnazarov
instructed Linge to submit the
expatriates’ passports to the Ministry the same day for exit
visas. Kholnazarov said that two
staff members and their
families would be permitted to remain in Tajikistan. He offered
a compromise and suggested that the expats could leave
Tajikistan and return on tourist visas.
(Note: Without work
visas, they may not legally continue their jobs at Operation
Mercy. End Note.) The decision
affects 32 international staff,
eight of whom are American citizens.
2. (SBU) When ConOff called Kholnazarov to inquire
about the
decision, Kholnazarov would not confirm that he had given a
deadline of ten days for Operation Mercy’s staff to leave
Tajikistan. (Note: Linge
maintains that Kholnazarov asserted
the ten day limit. End Note.)
Kholnazarov explained to ConOff
that Operation Mercy staff simply could not stay in Tajikistan
given that the local court has issued a statement on February 22
ordering Operation Mercy to stop its classes and activities
until the Ministry of Education grants it a license to teach
English language classes (reftel).
3. (C) According to Operation Mercy’s lawyer, a
Deputy
Minister of Justice relayed to her that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ decision to order the expats depart cannot be based on
the court’s statement and has no legal basis. Operation Mercy
filed an appeal on the court’s decision, but has not received a
reply from the Ministry of Justice.
The Ministry of Education
refuses to grant Operation Mercy a license because Operation
Mercy is working outside of its charter, based on «evidence»
obtained from a single slanderous newspaper article, mostly
likely written by a disgruntled former employee.
4. (C) Linge commented that Kholnazarov was
apologetic and
sympathetic during the meeting.
Kholnazarov indicated that the
decision did not come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but
«other» sources, inferring the State Committee on National
Security (formerly the Ministry of Security) is behind the
decision. It is unclear to Linge
why the State Committee on
National Security is investigating Operation Mercy. He asserts
that Operation Mercy has abided by all laws and regulations.
The organization has submitted all necessary documentation
promptly to apply for a license to teach English classes when it
learned of the deficiency.
5. (SBU) Although Operation Mercy characterizes itself
as a
non-denominational, non-governmental organization, its staff are
motivated into international assistance work based on their
Christian convictions and the organization is considered a
faith-based non-governmental organization.
6. (SBU) Post has sent a diplomatic note to the
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs requesting an official explanation for ordering
Operation Mercy’s international staff’s departure and expressing
concern over the government’s continuing hostile behavior
towards non-governmental organizations.
Embassy Officers are
engaging multiple ministries in an attempt to find a legal
solution suitable to both sides.
Officers are in frequent
communication with Operation Mercy’s American citizen employees.
The British Embassy had contacted
post and is also seeking
clarification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a number
of the affected Operation Mercy employees are either citizens of
the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth.
7. (C) COMMENT: Operation Mercy’s latest problem is another
example of the government’s intolerance towards nongovernmental
organizations. The Ministries of
Justice, Education and Foreign
Affairs justification for their decisions shows the use of rule
by law in Tajikistan, not rule of law.
It is also a clear
example of how the State Committee on National Security can
manipulate other ministries to achieve its goals.
8. (C) At this point, there is no indication that
the
government is targeting Christians.
Operation Mercy staff
DUSHANBE 00000443 002 OF 002
reports that some local Christians have been harassed and
questioned by the State Committee on National Security, but
specifically in relation to their activity with Operation Mercy.
PolOff has met with other members
of the Christian community
and they have not reported any negative behavior from the
government. A Korean Christian
Church is battling an ongoing
property dispute with the government, but the motivation does
not appear to be religion. END
COMMENT.
JACOBSON
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102804
date: 4/2/2007 12:17
refid: 07DUSHANBE467
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1698
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0467 0921217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021217Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9940
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1976
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1950
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1876
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RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/AMEMBASSY DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1629
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1936
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1418
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0151
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000467
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, ECON, EAID, ELAB, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: COCHRAN INTERVIEWS PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO FARM LIFE IN
TAJIKISTAN
1. «I would like to learn
more about artificial insemination,»
a number of Tajik dairy farmers repeated in recent interviews
for an agricultural exchange program.
Alexander Simon of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agriculture Service in
Almaty spent March 26-30 in Tajikistan interviewing candidates
for the Cochran Fellowship Program that sends farmers and
agronomists to the U.S. for two to three week long specialist
training programs. Simon and
Pol/EconOffs interviewed over 60
candidates in Dushanbe, Qurghon-Teppa, and Khujand for up to 20
slots in the 2007 and 2008 programs.
2. A farmer and bottler of
pickled mushrooms explained his need
for marketing training. A group
of veterinarians described
their idea to create a veterinary association to support private
veterinarians. Several farmers
requested help in finding and
developing better seed varieties.
Rural extension workers
sought assistance in implementing prophylactic measures to
prevent cattle disease. Fruit and
vegetable marketing ranked
high as a possible training topic, with many farmers lamenting
that they had no way of processing, transporting or selling
Tajikistan’s high-quality and largely organic produce outside
local markets.
3. The large number of strong
applicants demonstrated the
impact and importance of all U.S. professional training and
exchange programs. The majority
of the Cochran candidates were
experienced, educated farmers or local and national officials
who had no access to extension services or continuing education,
let alone Internet or other sources of new information about
farming techniques and technology.
3. COMMENT: As we look for more ways to integrate the
region
economically, the Cochran program represents an important
training and exchange program, not only providing specialized
training in agricultural techniques but also promoting American
culture and values to a segment of Tajik society with little or
no foreign exposure. Program
alumni cooperate with USAID-funded
and other programs to help disseminate the impact of their
training. Post appreciates the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
support for the critical area of non-cotton agricultural growth
in Tajikistan In the end, the
Cochran program may prove as
important as the bridge across the Pyanj River in transporting
Tajik melons from the Fergana valley to the markets of Karachi,
Pakistan. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102937
date: 4/3/2007 11:45
refid: 07DUSHANBE500
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2852
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0500/01 0931145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031145Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9976
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2026
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2035
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1937
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1419
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1619
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000500
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/3/2017
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, ICRC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDER REPORTS ON PRISON
CONDITIONS
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Fayzinisso Vohidova, a lawyer with the Center
for
Economic and Legal Support in Khujand, described to PolOff March
29 the horrendous prison conditions, corruption and human rights
abuses she saw when she secretly snuck into prison #23 in
Khujand, Tajikistan’s second largest city.
2. (C) Late last year, Vohidova received a letter
from inmates
housed in prison number 23 in Khujand desperately appealing for
her help. The prisoners wanted
her to advocate on their behalf
to improve prison conditions.
Vohidova delivered the letter to
the Sughd region’s prosecutor’s office, but received no response
and the office failed to act. The
prisoners also sent the
letter to local newspapers, which published the letter. After
the letter went public, the Ministry of Justice inspected the
prisons. Unfortunately after the
Ministry of Justice’s visit,
conditions worsened for the prisoners, according to Vohidova.
As a result, they sent a letter to local newspapers rescinding
the previous letter in hopes that the prison authorities would
alleviate the increased mistreatment.
3. (C) In December 2006, Vohidova bribed prison
officials to
allow her onto the prison compound so that she could see for
herself what the conditions were like and speak to the
prisoners. The stories the prisoners’
relayed and what she saw
for herself confirmed rumors about the horrendous prison
conditions in Tajikistan.
4. (SBU) The prison houses over 900 male inmates
crammed into
three barracks. Some inmates
share beds. The blankets are thin
and dirty. The facilities do not
have any heat or running
water. Toilet facilities are
outside. The inmates are fed dry
onions, pumpkin and salted cabbage three times a day. Local
businessmen provide them these meals as compensation for inmates
who work peeling and cleaning onions for the businesses. The
unlucky ones who do not work receive hot water and bread. The
businesses do not pay wages to the inmates.
5. (C) Medicine is not available within the prison,
but
inmates do have access to a separate medical facility, for a
price. Sick inmates, who can
afford to pay a hefty bribe (which
according to Embassy sources can be up to $5,000) are
transferred to the medical unit.
Even inmates who are not sick
take advantage of this opportunity to escape out of the prison
system. Once they are transferred
to the medical unit, many can
further bribe officials to return back to society.
Unfortunately for inmates, even those seriously ill, if they do
not have the money to pay the bribe, they must suffer in the
prison. Vohidova said that she
saw prisoners who appeared to be
malnourished, looking thin and sickly.
She suggested that many
prisoners most likely suffered from various diseases.
Government officials have publicly admitted that tuberculosis is
high among inmates.
6. (C) Four prisoners also told
Vohidova stories of alleged
torture. Vohidova pointed out
that most of the prisoners
subjected to torture and abuse are prisoners convicted of being
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or
other groups classified as terrorists by the Tajik government.
Having defended some of the convicted alleged terrorists, she
said that most of them actually are not members of terrorist
organizations, but were framed by the government or were in the
wrong place at the wrong time.
7. (C) Authorities routinely beat prisoners with
sticks. Some
inmates have been kept in isolation cells with no food. The
four inmates singled out three specific officials responsible
for the torture. Ever since the
prisoners publicly spoke out
against the inhumane treatment, prison authorities have begun to
examine phone records to identify which prisoners leaked the
information. Prisoners fear
retaliation from authorities.
8. (SBU) Ambassadors from
Tajikistan’s Principals’ Group (a
group of international ambassadors and Heads of Mission) have
requested meetings with senior level government officials to
discuss prison reform and uninhibited access to prisons for
DUSHANBE 00000500 002 OF 002
international organizations such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross as recently as February. However, authorities
have not yet granted a meeting.
9. (SBU) COMMENT: Without international monitors such as the
Red Cross checking prison conditions, it is difficult to
ascertain what is really occurring within prisons, but
Vohidova’s account paints a horrifying picture. Reports like
hers from human rights advocates and anecdotes from local
residents are the only sources available. PolOffs’ previous
meetings with the head of the prison system General Izzatullo
Sharipov, a notorious former warlord rumored to be both corrupt
and cruel, have not resulted in any increased access. In fact,
Sharipov adamantly refused to allow any discussion of the role
of the Red Cross in Tajikistan.
The authorities’ refusal to
allow international groups access indicates they have something
to hide and may benefit from the corruption — rumors borne out
by the sad story from Khujand.
END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 102942
date: 4/3/2007 12:25
refid: 07DUSHANBE501
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE501
header:
VZCZCXRO2895
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0501/01 0931225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031225Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9978
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1939
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1421
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1621
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000501
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/3/2017
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, ENRG, EAID, TI, IR, KZ, RS
SUBJECT: TAJIK FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAN, KYRGYZSTAN, CIVIL SOCIETY
AND GERALD METALS
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Zaripov, following his trip
to Astana March 27-29 for the EU Troika meetings with Central
Asian Foreign Ministers, met Ambassador April 3 to discuss a
full range of bilateral and regional issues:
Iran: Tajikistan supports UN
Security Council Resolution 1747,
and is privately urging Iran to comply with IAEA requirements.
Zaripov has asked President Rahmonov to consider a high-level
approach on this issue.
Regional Issues: The situation in
Kyrgyzstan bears a
frightening resemblance to the pre-civil war period in
Tajikistan; various regional players, including Russian and
Uzbekistan, would like to see the conflict escalate.
Civil Society: Zaripov protested
that Tajikistan showed «no
tendency» against civil society and non-governmental
organizations; Zaripov will personally work with the Ministry of
Justice on National Democratic Institute registration and will
«study» problems with Operation Mercy and Internews (septels).
The proposed Law on Public Associations (aka «the NGO law») is
currently on hold for further government analysis.
Gerald Metals: Tajikistan has
resolved the long-standing
dispute by agreeing to pay the entire 30 million dollars the
U.S. company has claimed following a default by the state-owned
aluminum company TadAZ. End
Summary.
«Economics Before Politics»
————————————
2. (SBU) Zaripov opened the
meeting by announcing that «our
long-term dispute has been resolved — guess what it is?» When
Ambassador said she hoped it was registration for the National
Democratic Institute, Zaripov shook his head, saying, «economics
before politics.» In a
convoluted legal decision, the Tajik
government will receive 30 million U.S. dollars from Ansol, a
government-owned «middleman» which had previously facilitated
aluminum purchased from Tajik Aluminum producer TadAZ by
Connecticut-based Gerald Metals.
The Tajik Government will pay
the entire 30 million dollars to Gerald to settle its claim
following a TadAz global default in December 2004, waiving the
«usual service
