id: 70410
date: 7/6/2006 9:10
refid: 06DUSHANBE1283
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0161
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1283 1870910
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060910Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8019
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1599
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1470
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1416
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1667
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1210
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0994
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9318
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001283
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/6/2016
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KIRF, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: MODERATE IRPT DEPUTY REFUSES PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP
CLASSIFIED BY: HOAGLAND, AMBASSADOR, EXEC, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan’s (IRPT) First
Deputy Chairman, Muhiddin Kabiri refused to accept the party’s
chairmanship. Kabiri told PolOff
at the Embassy’s July 4th
celebration that the party’s current chairman, Said Abdullo
Nuri, asked Kabiri to be the next IRPT head, but Kabiri declined
citing that he is too moderate and does not have Nuri’s popular
appeal. Nuri has been suffering
from stomach cancer and Kabiri
suggested that he only has 2-3 years to live, optimistically.
Kabiri claimed that he is comfortable in his position as the
First Deputy Chairman and is confident that the party will be
able to find someone else to lead them.
2. (C) Kabiri firmly believes that President Rahmonov does not
want him to be IRPT chairman.
Rahmonov has already approached
Nuri and asked him to select someone who is religiously
conservative. Kabiri said that Rahmonov
would like to see an
«extremist» lead the IPRT, insinuating that Rahmonov wants to
appoint someone who would polarize the party. Thus far, Nuri
has refused Rahmonov’s advice.
3. (C) COMMENT: Rahmonov’s advice
to appoint a religious
conservative as IRPT chairman would serve his own political
interests. If an Islamic
conservative were to lead the party,
it would further divide the party into a moderate wing and
religiously conservative faction, thereby weakening the IRPT,
the strongest of the political parties not viewed to be a
government creation. Rahmonov’s
reported suggestion to Nuri is
out of character with government statements decrying religious
extremism. With the appointment
of an extremist, it could give
the government greater ammunition to use against the IRPT and
more excuses to crackdown on the party’s activities. With the
party’s leadership uncertain, there is a danger that Central
Asia’s only legally recognized Islamic political party will be
in jeopardy.
4. (C) COMMENT CONT’D: Kabiri has
also received pressure from
other quarters. Kabiri told DCM
that Mayor of Dushanbe and Head
of Parliament, Ubaidolloyev pointedly asked Kabiri if he met
with President Bush during Kabiri’s trip to the United States to
plot a «color revolution.»
From the Embassy’s perspective, it
is a shame the talented and articulate Kabiri has removed
himself from the higher stakes political game. He has always
been a transparent and forthcoming leader. That said, we do not
believe his political career is over.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 70550
date: 7/7/2006 4:06
refid: 06DUSHANBE1285
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1350
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1285/01 1880406
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 070406Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8021
INFO RHMFISS/ACCIS LANGLEY AFB VA
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0021
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUKAINT/CDRUSAREUR DCSINT HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0024
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 0596
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1627
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1600
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC//
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1471
RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0645
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1417
RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RHMFISS/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//FM
RHMFISS/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHTA/USDAO ALMATY KZ
RUEHEK/USDAO BISHKEK KG
RUEHDBU/USDAO DUSHANBE TI
RUEHMO/USDAO MOSCOW
RUEHNT/USDAO TASHKENT UZ
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1621
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1668
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1211
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9320
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001285
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/6/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK FOREIGN MINISTER NAZAROV ON INCREASING REGIONAL
INTRIGUE
CLASSIFIED BY: THOMAS ARMBRUSTER, CDA, FRONT OFFICE , State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)
1. (S) In a ‘just between us’
session with the Ambassador on
July 6, Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov offered a litany of
challenges to Tajikistan’s regional foreign policy and even
sovereignty. The meeting was
ostensibly to preview Secretary
Rumsfeld’s July 10-11 visit with President Rahmonov, but Nazarov
is clearly focusing on much more than the U.S.-Tajik bilateral
relationship.
2. (S) The intrigue begins with
neighboring Uzbekistan.
Nazarov expects a «provocation» any day, because of Uzbek
dissatisfaction with Tajikistan’s increasingly close
relationship with the United States, Tajik debt to Uzbekistan,
the threat of Tajik hydropower controlling regional water and
energy resources, and previous regional commitments to begin a
visa-free regime with Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan is suspected by
some to have been behind a number of incidents including a
deadly attack on a Tajik border post and a harmless, if noisy
late-night series of small downtown explosions some weeks ago.
Nazarov believes Uzbekistan could follow Russia’s lead and cut
off gas supplies to Tajikistan as well, just as Russia has to
show displeasure with Kiev and Tblisi.
President Rahmonov and
Uzbek President Karimov apparently lost ground at a recent
meeting in Sochi, with Karimov promising to cut off roads to
Tajikistan if the TadAz aluminum plant expands and if RusAl
actually builds Rogun dam and hydropower station.
3. (S) But it is Russian
propaganda, covert activities, and
diplomatic pressure that Nazarov admits will complicate any U.S.
proposal for increased military engagement in Tajikistan. He
described a diplomatic flap started by an article attributed to
Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Karasin.
Karasin was reported
to have cautioned that the Americans were preparing to offer
Tajikistan «hundreds of millions of dollars» for a U.S. base.
The Tajiks protested with a dipnote that the Russians demanded
be withdrawn. Tajik — Russian
relations have been off kilter
ever since the Russians (and Uzbeks we learned) pressured other
countries not to attend the U.S.- sponsored counternarcotics
DUSHANBE 00001285 002 OF 002
conference held in Dushanbe in May.
All of this makes for a
«very complicated situation» according to Nazarov. Tajikistan
also has to consider its commitments to regional powers to CIS
bodies to which it belongs (like CSTO and EEC) and to consult
with regional before entering into new security arrangements.
4. (S) Nazarov said all Central
Asian leaders would be called
to Moscow in July and again to a meeting in Sochi in August for
«consultative meetings» with President Putin. When the
Ambassador noted Tajikistan is a sovereign country and can make
its own decisions, Nazarov smiled and said, «no one is really
sovereign yet.»
5. (S) COMMENT: At the end of the day, Tajikistan’s own
fundamental interests include a stable and prosperous
Afghanistan, something the United States is working hard to
ensure and that Russia has only a limited interest in. As
President Rahmonov’s Foreign Policy Adviser told the Ambassador,
Tajikistan welcomes the issue of further U.S. military
engagement in Tajikistan, but behind the scenes there will be
many long discussions until the President himself declares his
intentions, if indeed Tajikistan is asked.HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71041
date: 7/12/2006 8:47
refid: 06DUSHANBE1294
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6251
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1294 1930847
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120847Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8030
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1602
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1704
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1675
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1629
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9332
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001294
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EINV, EAID, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: LET THEM EAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN CAKE! DUSHANBE’S MAYOR
FIGHTS POPULAR BISTRO
1. (SBU) A letter from the French Ambassador asking
the
Dushanbe city government to halt street construction during an
outdoor Bastille Day celebration has led to the temporary
closure of a popular Dushanbe restaurant and highlighted just
how risky it is to invest in Tajikistan, or even more dangerous,
to invest in a successful enterprise.
La Grande Dame,
Dushanbe’s only truly European restaurant, announced by email
July 11 it was closed until further notice, due to
«circumstances beyond control.» The restaurant had catered two
large U.S. Embassy receptions a week earlier, and enjoyed a full
house most nights, thanks not only to the fresh mozzarella, top
quality steaks, and flourless chocolate cake, but also due to
the lack of alternative high quality European eateries in
Dushanbe.
2. (SBU) PolOff visited the site July 11 to find a
distraught
wait staff, an irate French ambassador and French cultural
attachi standing on the terrace amidst roof panels that had been
torn off and stacked. The staff
explained that the Mayor’s
office had ordered the demolition of the front part of the
restaurant, claiming it was illegally constructed. (NOTE: The
proprietor, an Australian national who also manages a U.S-funded
health project, built an addition and a fagade to give the
building the feel of a French bistro.
END NOTE.) The staff
reported that various fire and tax inspectors had come weeks
earlier, but walked away without the usual payoffs they have
come to expect from small businesses because the restaurant
thought its permits were in order.
3. (SBU) The French Ambassador said a few days earlier
he had
sent a letter to the city government asking them to halt road
construction during the French Embassy’s July 14 reception, to
be held at La Grande Dame. For
unknown reasons, the request
unleashed the wrath of the Mayor, who ordered the closure and
demolition. «Tajikistan is a medieval Emirate,» raged the
Ambassador. «The Emir decides something, and no one else can
contradict him.» The
Ambassador reported he had officially
complained to the Foreign Minister and a senior official in the
presidential apparatus, who refused to call the Mayor’s office.
«Everyone is afraid of the Mayor,» fumed the Ambassador.
«The
Emir always gets what he wants. It’s the Middle Ages here.»
4. (SBU) PolOff later spoke with the proprietor, who
between
sobs explained that the order was only the latest in a long
story involving the restaurant and the Mayor’s office. «We
thought we had taken care of all the paperwork. The French
Ambassador’s letter just stirred up a hornet’s nest.» While the
restaurant received no written document ordering the demolition,
she resigned herself to losing this battle. She later noted
that the city’s demolition team acknowledged that her building
paperwork was in order, and refused to demolish the fagade for
fear of being sued. However, she preferred to demolish the
addition herself, in order to rebuild, than let the city do it.
«This time we’ll do a remodelling that the Mayor’s office cannot
reject.»
5. (SBU) COMMENT:
This incident represents more than just
small business fighting city hall and underscores how precarious
any investment in Dushanbe can be.
Conflicting regulations,
surprise inspections and corruption from the top down create a
business environment designed to keep even the most
conscientious business owners in fear that if they do not grease
the right palm, their business will be shut down. Embassy
Dushanbe knows plenty of examples of the Mayor’s capricious and
egregious behaviour, particularly in his administration’s
reluctance to allow Dushanbe’s sister city Boulder, Colorado, to
donate a million-dollar Internet cafi.
6. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: La Grande Dame offered good food
and a lovely atmosphere, a change from the typical faux- Russian
cuisine with a neo-Soviet ear-splitting floor show that passes
for high-class dining in Tajikistan.
Not only does its closure
eliminate the only restaurant a foreign businessman might feel
comfortable patronizing, the saga adds to the long list of
reasons for visiting foreign investors to exercise caution. The
closure of La Grande Dame is another sign that Tajikistan’s
power figures just don’t get what it will take to get lasting
investment in the economy. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71072
date: 7/12/2006 11:35
refid: 06DUSHANBE1296
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6417
PP RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV
DE RUEHDBU #1296/01 1931135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121135Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8032
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1705
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1692
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1663
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1630
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RUEHNO/USEUCOM FMFO BRUSSELS BE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1670
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1213
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9334
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001296
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, TI
SUBJECT: RUMSFELD VISIT AND RUSSIA — WHO’S ON THE SIDE OF THE
ANGELS?
DUSHANBE 00001296 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) Russian Charge Viacheslav
Svetlichny was the first
diplomat to seek a readout of Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit to
Tajikistan and his meeting with President Rahmonov. The
Ambassador joked with him on July 12 that Svetlichny must surely
already have a near-verbatim treatment of the meeting from the
Tajik Minister of Security. That
elicited a raised eyebrow from
the Russian. In fact, nothing the
Ambassador said was able to
pry from Svetlichny just what Russia is thinking in its apparent
goal to strictly limit the role of the United States in Central
Asia, especially when counternarcotics and counterterrorism
operations are directly in Russia’s own interest.
2. (S) The Ambassador said he
thought for a long time about
what he could provide that would help the U.S.-Russian bilateral
relationship. He said he
concluded that he would share as much
of his notes as possible.
Svetlichny almost spilled his coffee
reaching for his notepad.
3. (S) The Ambassador outlined
the broad themes of stability in
Afghanistan, counternarcotics, Central Asian relations,
especially at the leadership levels, and Rahmonov’s assessment
of Iran’s Ahmadinejad. The
Ambassador said that Rumsfeld did
not ask for a military base; in fact, the United States is in
the business of closing bases, but the United States continues
to need access to facilities in Central Asia to support
Operation Enduring Freedom.
Specifically, the United States is
interested in search and rescue, refueling and logistical
capabilities. While overflight
and emergency refueling
agreements are already in place between the United States and
Tajikistan, there is a need for more space for refueling
operations and transiting materiel and personnel. In short,
Rahmonov’s answer, the Ambassador explained, was that now is not
the right time for increased engagement because of the new
status quo in Central Asia.
«Times have changed since 2001.»
4. (S) Secretary Rumsfeld said he
understood Tajikistan’s
situation and that each country had to balance its own interests
and decide. The United States
understands the pressure
Tajikistan is under and the decision will not change the
U.S.-Tajik relationship or U.S. assistance.
5. (S) Svetlichny thanked the
Ambassador for the overview and
said it provided a «different view.» Svetlichny said that
considering the closure of Uzbekistan as an option for the
United States, it was «logical» that other countries would
bear
more of the burden of supporting Afghan operations. The
Ambassador said it was important to have more than one option,
and he described in detail the limitations of the air facility
at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, based on his personal tour there with
the Commander. The Ambassador
said the United States has no
intention of «encircling or threatening Russia,» but perhaps
it
was naive to believe that Russia would allow these Central Asian
countries to make their own decisions as independent and
sovereign nations.
6. (S) The Ambassador then pushed
further, saying he sincerely
hopes for a Central Asia that is stable and prosperous. He said
he would like to see Russia find a way to work with the United
States to help promote policies that benefit the region and
DUSHANBE 00001296 002.2 OF 002
Russia itself in such fields as counternarcotics and terrorism.
As an example, he suggested, making clear he was speaking
unofficially, that in an ideal world, the United States and
Russia should be able to share Ayni Airfield as a visible symbol
of their Presidents’ desire to cooperate productively.
7. (S) Svetlichny sought more
information on the U.S.
consultations with Tajikistan prior to the meeting. The DCM,
taking notes, asked the Russian Charge to first explain Russia’s
advice to Tajikistan. Svetlichny
claimed that the Russian
Embassy had received no instructions, but «perhaps» Putin had
put the subject to Rahmonov in Sochi or Minsk or Shanghai.
8. (S) The Ambassador
acknowledged that Tajikistan is bound by
its Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other commitments to
consult with member nations before entering into new security
arrangements, but he blasted Russia’s «new best friend»
Uzbekistan for flouting their international commitment to the
Eurasia Economic Community to demine the Uzbek-Tajik border and
allow for visa-free travel with neighboring countries. The
Ambassador said that Russia could surely urge Central Asian
countries to do the right thing on a number of issues, using its
weight in regional fora. This is
2006, the Ambassador said, and
important powers should be able to work together in difficult
regions like Central Asia and Afghanistan. «I know that is what
President Bush wants,» the Ambassador said. Svetlichny agreed
that President Putin also espouses a cooperative relationship
with the United States. The Ambassador concluded that Presidents
are not gods, but they have angels and devils working beneath
them. He said he hoped his views
represented those in both
countries who are on the side of the angels.
9. (S) COMMENT: The Ambassador’s briefing may generate
discussion in Moscow. He
explicitly said some of his
outside-the-box suggestions were unofficial, based on his
experience in the region. The
Ambassador said that one of the
lessons of the Rumsfeld visit was that the United States and
Russia have much work to do to come to a common understanding on
the way forward in Central Asia.
President Putin once said
there is «room for everyone in Central Asia.» While Tajikistan
may welcome a more robust U.S. presence, the reality for now is
that the limits of this small country’s sovereignty are
described in Moscow, not Dushanbe.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71255
date: 7/13/2006 12:23
refid: 06DUSHANBE1314
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06Dushanbe312
header:
VZCZCXRO7800
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1314 1941223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131223Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8052
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1707
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1694
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1665
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1678
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1632
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1605
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1600
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0995
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1215
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1421
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9354
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001314
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/16
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EAIR, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK AIR STILL DOESN’T GET IT
REF: Dushanbe 312
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas Armbruster, DCM, State, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
Five months after taking the helm of
Tajikistan State Airlines (TSA), Director Hakimsho Tilloyev
declined to identify any improvements or changes under his
leadership and instead complained about Turkish Air stealing
TSA’s passengers to Istanbul. He informed PolOff July 12 that
SIPDIS
TSA still intended to modernize its fleet by leasing two
SIPDIS
«western-style» aircraft, but avoided mentioning Boeing.
However, Tajik Air was two to three years away from implementing
real structural reform by separating the airlines from the
airport and air traffic control functions, changes recommended
by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). «Nothing
happens quickly here,» he noted in
reference to the proposed reforms.
«We do not want to make the
mistakes like Kyrgyzstan,» where the state airline eventually
went bankrupt. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) In marked change from February meeting
(reftel), when
he enthusiastically shared with EmbOffs ideas about streamlining
the bloated TSA staff and improving customer service and baggage
handling, Tilloyev had very little to say about his first half
year on the job. «We’re working,
» he shrugged. TSA is in the
process of creating a website for reservations, but Tilloyev
indicated their were still no immediate plans to join an
international reservations system.
3. (C) Turkish Air will not receive permission to
run a second
weekly flight between Istanbul and Dushanbe. Tilloyev
complained that since Turkish Air began its flight in February,
TSA has suffered losses on it own flight to Istanbul, and had to
SIPDIS
consolidate its Munich and Istanbul flights into one. However,
he welcomed carriers such as Lufthansa or KLM, but reported they
were not interested. When pressed
why he would allow another
European carrier, but refused Turkish Air a second flight, he
frowned. «Turkish Air will
run us out of business to Istanbul.
As it is, we are down half a million dollars.»
4. (C) Flights between Tajikistan and Moscow remain
lucrative, although competition from 13 different Russian
carriers flying to Tajikistan could threaten TSA’s profits.
Tilloyev noted that running other international flights, such as
Dushanbe-Delhi, had cost the company up to $30,000 per flight
and were not viable.
5. (C) Tilloyev stated that an upcoming visit of
Ernst and
Young consultants from Moscow was part of the technical
assistance attached to a $5 million EBRD commercial loan to
modernize TSA. (NOTE: TSA is currently paying off an $8
million EBRD loan to repave parts of the Dushanbe runway. END
NOTE.) Tilloyev was nonchalant
about the role of the
consultants, claiming that Ernst and Young would decide whether
TSA should join the international reservation system.
SIPDIS
6. (C) COMMENT:
Tilloyev appears only interested in doing the
minimum to modernize the airlines and preserve the status quo.
Tajik Air has long been a cash cow for TSA employees and other
powerful government officials. On
any given flight a certain
number of seats are reserved for high-ranking officials, and
getting seats often involves paying extra to the ticketing
agent. True modernization could
essentially kill the cash cow
by forcing transparency and competition in Tajikistan’s
neo-Soviet airline sector.
Kyrgyzstan’s experience serves as an
off-cited cautionary tale for Tajik air authorities.
7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Tilloyev’s invitation to other
European carriers while rejecting a second Turkish Air flight
indicates he does not understand that international passengers
will choose ANY carrier, and any route, rather than suffer Tajik
Air. It also underscores his lack
of understanding the
connection between business travel and attracting foreign
investment. As things stand, only
the most intrepid business
travelers will make the effort to fly with Tajik Air. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71267
date: 7/13/2006 13:31
refid: 06DUSHANBE1315
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06STATE111144
header:
VZCZCXRO7883
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1315 1941331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131331Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8053
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1672
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1216
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1625
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1695
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1422
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1679
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1601
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1666
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1633
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9355
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001315
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, KN, KNNP, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREAN MISSILE LAUNCHES
DEMARCHE DELIVERED
REF: STATE 111144
PolOff delivered talking points per reftel to Deputy Chief of
the Department for Asia and Africa Affairs at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs July 12. The MFA
official said Tajikistan
wanted to see a peaceful resolution to this problem through
diplomatic means. Although
Tajikistan does not have interests
in North Korea, it did not want to see the problem escalated to
a military conflict and recognized that it is in the
international community’s best interest to stave off future
missile launches. The Tajik
government does not have an
official stance on the issue, but will inform the Embassy if it
issues an official statement.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71389
date: 7/14/2006 13:18
refid: 06DUSHANBE1329
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9134
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1329 1951318
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141318Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8066
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1635
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1680
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1606
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1217
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0996
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9371
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001329
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S SDPT CHAIRMAN SUFFERS STROKE, ALLEGES FOUL
PLAY
CLASSIFIED BY: William Hamer, IPO, State, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Rahmatullo Zoyirov, Chairman of the Social
Democratic
Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) met with PolOff July 13 after
suffering a minor stroke two weeks earlier. Zoyirov, an
energetic opposition politician, was noticeably absent during
the Embassy’s official opening on June 28 and the July 4
reception. After the stroke,
Zoyirov says he went into hiding
so no one would notice that half
of his body was paralyzed.
Since then, he has recovered tremendously and gained most of the
movement in his body, but is visibly weak. His walk is slow and
the right side of his body shows little movement.
2. (C) Zoyirov (48) claims that prior to the stroke,
he had no
health problems. Doctors recently
examined him and declared
that his body is perfectly healthy despite suffering the stroke.
Because of this sudden attack,
Zoyirov and his deputies suspect
he was poisoned. As a frequent
critic of the government,
Zoyirov has been the target of government harassment. In May
the General Prosecutor’s office called him in for several days
of questioning about his previous legal work defending alleged
Hizb-ut Tahrir members. Over the
past few months, Ministry of
Security officials have allegedly questioned Zoyirov’s neighbors
and asked them to spy on him. His
daughter has even been
followed at school, he said.
3. (C) Because the SDPT is largely driven by
Zoyirov’s
personality and public character, the party has not publicly
released information on Zoyirov’s health. Public knowledge that
Zoyirov is unhealthy and suffered a stroke could hurt the
party’s already weak morale and membership base. When asked
about Zoyirov’s whereabouts, party officials explain he is
traveling out of the country.
4. (C) Zoyirov will seek treatment in Moscow and
possibly
elsewhere in Europe. He asked
PolOff’s assistance in obtaining
medicine from the United States.
He said the medicine his
doctor prescribed cannot be found easily in Tajikistan, and he
alleged that all the medicine found in pharmacies are illegal,
fake drugs. PolOff wished Zoyirov
well and assured him that she
would see what she could do.
5. (C) COMMENT:
Regardless of whether Zoyirov was poisoned or
suffered a stroke naturally, his deteriorating health strikes a
blow to the SDPT. The party’s
membership has declined
significantly. Newspaper articles
continue to slander the SDPT
as well as other perceived opposition groups. Known as the
country’s top lawyer, Zoyirov is well-respected and no one else
in the party has the same national recognition, primarily
because Zoyirov, before he went into opposition, was President
Rahmonov’s chief legal advisor and played a key role in drafting
Tajikistan’s first constitution.
6. (C) COMMENT CONT’D: Of the eight registered political
parties, only four are considered genuine parties that offer an
alternative viewpoint to the ruling People’s Democratic Party of
Tajikistan: the Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRPT), the Socialist
Party (SPT), the Democratic Party (DPT) and the SDPT. Of these
four, the IRPT’s chairman, Said Abdullo Nuri is ill with cancer,
DPT Chairman Mahmmadruzi Iskandarov is serving a 23-year prison
sentence, and the SPT has split into two factions. The
legally-registered SPT faction allies itself with the
government, and the unregistered faction has been pushed to the
sidelines and lost the majority of its membership. Although
President Rahmonov and the PDPT hold a monopoly on power, if
Zoyirov had to pull out of politics because of health reasons,
it would sideline one of the few true opposition parties. His
opposition voice serves as a reminder that there are people with
alternative viewpoints in Tajikistan.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71705
date: 7/18/2006 11:29
refid: 06DUSHANBE1353
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE666|06DUSHANBE707
header:
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1709
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1697
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1668
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1681
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1603
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1607
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1476
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1626
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1673
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0997
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9395
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001353
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/P, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: DPT’S
ISKANDAROV SAFE IN PRISON, FOR NOW
REF: A. DUSHANBE 666
B. DUSHANBE 707
1. (U) Democratic Party of Tajikistan’s (DPT) Deputy
Chairman,
Rahmatullo Valiev assured PolOff July 12 that the DPT’s Chairman
Mahmmadruzi Iskandarov is not being maltreated in prison, and
discussed the emergence of the «Vatan» (Motherland) faction of
the DPT.
2. (U) Valiev reported that Iskandarov’s lawyer visited him
in prison July 8 and gave a press conference afterwards
declaring that the DPT Chairman is in fine health and has not
been abused in prison. Since the
press conference, only one
paper in Tajikistan published an article on Iskandarov and two
other weekly papers printed small blurbs on his status.
Iskandarov began serving his 23-year sentence in January 2006.
Only his mother and lawyer were permitted to visit him — one
time each.
3. (U) News articles reported July 17 the DPT’s
«Vatan»
(Motherland) faction announced they do not intend to split the
party into two wings, but rather keep the DPT whole. Seven
members of the DPT announced in April they would petition the
formal party apparatus to renew the party’s leadership and
direction. DPT members have not
yet voted on whether Vatan’s
leadership will supersede current leaders including Iskandarov’s
brother and Valiev.
4. (SBU) Valiev, convinced that Vatan is the
brainchild of the
People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan’s Deputy Chairman,
Davlati Davlatov, said that Vatan intends to name a new chairman
and oust Iskandarov. If the DPT
splits into two parties,
Iskandarov would still be able to remain Chairman of the old
DPT, leaving Vatan with less clout.
A split in the DPT could
also complicate Iskandarov’s status in detention. The Tajik
government already does not recognize him as a political
prisoner. If he is no longer the
official party chairman,
Valiev worries, Vatan could lend
support to the government’s
position and cause Iskandarov’s case to be dropped from
international organizations’ radar.
5. (SBU) COMMENT:
In April, when the faction first surfaced,
Valiev was confident that Vatan would not win over the DPT’s
membership. However, in the
latest meeting, he appeared
increasingly nervous about the group and instead of dismissing
them, acknowledges they pose a legitimate threat to the party’s
current leadership. It appears
likely that the DPT members may
choose Vatan over the current leadership.
6. (SBU) COMMENT CONT’D: Iskandarov is isolated in prison
with infrequent visits permitted, so his status and state of
health are difficult to track. In
a meeting July 12 the
Prosecutor General was unable to comment on where Iskandarov was
being held.. Earlier in the
year, the DPT had tried to rally
its supporters by alleging that Iskandarov was abused while in
detention and his basic human rights violated. Their quiet
stance on his status lately is surprising. However, their
interests lie in preserving
Iskandarov’s image as a political
prisoner so as to avoid Vatan marginalizing him from the game
entirely. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71855
date: 7/19/2006 9:38
refid: 06DUSHANBE1354
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE541
header:
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RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1710
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1669
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1219
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1627
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1674
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0998
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9396
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001354
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: JEHOVAH’S
WITNESSES UNDER SCRUTINY
REF: DUSHANBE 541
1. (U) Tajik media reported that Murodullo Davlatov,
Chairman
of the State Committee for Religious Affairs (SCRA), in a press
conference July 13, singled out the Jehovah’s Witnesses and said
that the group’s proselytizing activities «arouse public
indignation.» Valery Dudaev,
Tajikistan’s Jehovah’s Witnesses
Representative, met with PolOff July 17 to discuss the roots of
Davlatov’s statements.
2. (SBU) Dudaev reported that in an earlier meeting,
SCRA
Deputy Chairman Rashidov showed Dudaev letters to the SCRA from
the Ministry of Security (MOS) and Ministry of Interior (MOI)
complaining about Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Dudaev said these
letters state the same complaints Davlatov has publicly voiced,
including parents’ objection to their children converting to a
different faith and the public’s general annoyance with
Jehovah’s Witnesses. The usually
moderate and
progressive-minded SCRA Deputy Chairman Rashidov told Dudaev he
agrees with the MOI and MOS’s letters of complaints and asked
the organization to stop proselytizing.
3. (SBU) Dudaev reported that since Davlatov’s
statements,
Jehovah’s Witnesses have not faced any direct harassment, but
did encounter other problems recently.
About two months ago,
Tajik militia confiscated a truckload of religious literature
Jehovah’s Witnesses imported into Tajikistan. After detaining
nine members for about three
hours and questioning them, the
militia released the members and their literature. In addition,
although Jehovah’s Witnesses had its national charter approved
by former SCRA Chairman Ahmedov and is registered, the local
government in Tursunzoda still will not register that chapter.
Thus far, local officials have turned a blind eye to Jehovah’s
Witnesses activities and have not forced the 100 members in
Tursunzoda to close down.
4. (U) In Davlatov’s statements to the press, he
observed that
religious organizations of all faiths often act outside the
scope of their charters and national law, including charity
organizations that also carry out religious work. He named the
Turkish organization Ufuq as one such group and said that the
SCRA has also met with the charity’s management.
5. (SBU) COMMENT:
Davlatov’s statements may be an attempt to
garner support for his draft law on religion that has been
sidelined. If the public believes
religious organizations are
operating outside of their bounds and need to be reigned in, it
may support the new draft law that restricts religious activity
even further (reftel).
Specifically for the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Davlatov’s comments signal potential trouble. The
organization will be increasingly scrutinized and the government
may look for any excuse to clamp down on the group’s activities.
It is unlikely the Turusonzoda
office will be registered in the
near future. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 71898
date: 7/19/2006 13:33
refid: 06DUSHANBE1361
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1185
header:
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DE RUEHDBU #1361/01 2001333
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INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1638
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1426
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1220
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0999
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9405
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001361
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL, S/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TIT-FOR-TAT OP-ED SLAMS AMBASSADOR’S SUPPORTING TAJIK
SOVEREIGNTY
REF: DUSHANBE 1185
DUSHANBE 00001361 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) SUMMARY: The steady stream
of (probably)
Russian-influenced black propaganda
against the United States continues in the Tajik press. A
recent article alleges U.S. NGOs
foment «color revolutions,» the United States has done nothing
for Tajikistan’s economic
development, the purpose of the U.S. — built Pyanzh River Bridge
is to harm Russian interests,
and U.S. foreign policy is founded on global control of energy
resources. Foreign Minister
Nazarov described the article to the Ambassador as disgusting.
END SUMMARY.
2. (U) On July 13, «Biznis i politika» published a front-page
reaction to the Ambassador’s
June 22 op-ed, «Sovereign States Make Their Own Decisions,»
entitled «Some Reflections at the
Main Entrance to the New Building of the U.S. Embassy.»
3. (U) The article opens sarcastically that the Ambassador
Hoagland «once again declares that the
United States is a noble knight of democracy and progress who
cares about the well being of
others, in this case Central Asian countries, without any
efforts to pursue its own interests.»
It then analyzes the goals and methods the United States uses to
gain political influence in
Central Asia and Tajikistan in particular.
4. (U) It notes that «the entire Tajik society,» including
mass
media, the political elite, the
financial and banking sectors, as well as students and young
people are targets of U.S.
political influence in Tajikistan, through which Washington
promotes its «democratic and political
reforms.» The article
alleges the U.S. Embassy uses the NGO
sector to foment and support
«color revolutions» in post-Soviet countries.
5. The articles alleges the United States has made no real
contributions to the economic
development of Tajikistan. As an
example of meaningless
assistance, it says the U.S. sent
shipping containers left over from its construction to a border
post to be used for totally
inappropriate living quarters for the border guards and customs
officials.
6. (U) The articles raises suspicion over the rushed
construction of the U.S.-funded bridge
across the Pyanzh River to Afghanistan, asking why the bridge is
important given the
continuing instability in Afghanistan and the increase in drug
trafficking across the
Tajik-Afghan border. The author
asserts that the reason behind
the bridge is to gradually
decrease Russian influence in the region and establish control
over the uranium resources
of the Tian Shan Mountains, and potential gas and oil supply
routes. The article presumes
that the real reason behind U.S. efforts to export freedom
around the world is to gain control
over the world’s energy and oil resources.
7. (U) The article concludes archly that «the United States has
clearly identified its
geo-strategic interests in Central Asia.» The author suggests
that Ambassador Hoagland’s
assertion the «our goal is to support the independence and
sovereignty of the states of
Central Asia» is disingenuous and is merely a smokescreen hiding
DUSHANBE 00001361 002.2 OF 002
the United States’ real
intentions.
8. (U) COMMENT. FM Nazarov first
brought this article to our
attention on July 17. When
it appeared, Tajik authorities tried to track down the by-line
author, «but no such journalist
exists.» Calling the article
disgusting, Nazarov said it’s
clearly from «certain sources»
who want to harm the U.S.-Tajikistan relationship. We seldom
respond to the endless
flow of «black propaganda» in the Tajik media. However, we note
as soon as we place an
Ambassador’s op-ed or interview, we’re sure to see a rejoinder.
As junk articles go, this
one was not especially damaging because it contained almost
nothing new, except the
allegation that the United States intends to monopolize
Tajikistan’s uranium deposits.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
