id: 53260
date: 2/16/2006 11:45
refid: 06DUSHANBE311
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9445
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0311 0471145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161145Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6712
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1417
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1412
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1357
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1300
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1331
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1277
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1176
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1430
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0954
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1463
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7821
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL/IRF, INR, S/CT
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL
ALMATY PASS TO USAID
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, KISL, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: SOMETIMES IT’S BETTER TO ASK PERMISSION THAN BEG
FORGIVENESS
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) USAID Dushanbe requested
guidance from the Ambassador
February 15 on a sensitive issue.
The U.S. NGO Community
Habitat and Finance (CHF)’s Alternative to Conflict in
Tajikistan program has an Economic Opportunity Center (EOC) in
Isfara in the sensitive Farghana Valley that offers computer,
English-language, and other economic development courses. A
local young imam is an active and contributing member of the EOC
advisory board.
2. (C) Two of the participants in
an EOC computer course are
young men recently released from prison after having served
terms for allegedly being members of the extremist group Hizb
ut-Tahrir (HT). The two applied
for an advertised EOC Program
Manager position. The interview
panel judged that one of the
two is well qualified for the USAID-funded job. Before offering
him the job, CHF decided to check with USAID Almaty. USAID
Almaty queried USAID Dushanbe, which consulted with Embassy
Dushanbe. The Embassy is grateful
for this consultation.
3. (C) While the United States is
a nation of «second chances»
where any kind of discrimination against qualified candidates is
usually anathema, in this case the Embassy strongly recommended
against hiring the alleged former HT member.
4. (C) The Government of
Tajikistan is extremely worried about
Islamic radicalism, and its intelligence agencies place a high
priority on surveilling suspects and attempting to penetrate HT
cells. In 2005, about 300 alleged
HT members were arrested.
5. (C) A U.S.-funded NGO hiring a
formerly imprisoned alleged
HT member, even in all innocence, would have raised a red flag
for the government. It also would
have given a golden
opportunity to anti-U.S. elements in the Ministry of Security to
present to President Rahmonov «concrete evidence» that the
United States connives with Islamic radicals to overthrow
governments in the region, as rumored by «the Great Game
players.» Finally, it would
have given ammunition to those who
argue that foreign NGOs are dangerous.
6. (C) We regret this violation
of the American values of
fairness and good faith. However,
given the political context,
the recommendation not to hire had to be made.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53425
date: 2/17/2006 11:37
refid: 06DUSHANBE316
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0902
PP RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0316 0481137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171137Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6717
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1380
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1421
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1416
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1361
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1304
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1383
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1335
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1280
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1180
RUCNCRI/VIENNA CRIME COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1434
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0958
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1466
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7826
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000316
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EUR/PPD, EUR/RUS, EUR/ACE, INL, R
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PROP, PTER, SNAR, KCRM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TURNING THE PROPAGANDA OF COMPETITION INTO THE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY OF COOPERATION
1. U.S. Ambassador Hoagland and
Russian Ambassador Ramazan
Abdulatipov jointly presented certificates to the first 15
graduates of the U.S.-funded Ministry of Interior Criminal
Intelligence Analytical Center February 17 in Dushanbe. With
INL funding, the United States renovated and equipped the center
and paid for the Swiss-Russian firm Avicomp to provide the
professional training in criminal analysis.
2. Ambassador Hoagland emphasized
the important symbolism of
U.S.-Russian cooperation to further professionalize Tajikistan’s
ability to fight trans-national crime.
Ambassador Abdulatipov
placed the cooperation within the context of President Putin’s
G-8 counter-terrorism initiative.
A large number of Tajik,
Russian, and other international journalists covered the event.
3. An identical U.S.-funded
project is under way at
Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency.
It is intended that the
criminal intelligence analysis program will expand to all Tajik
law-enforcement and security ministries before the end of 2007.
This professional upgrade will allow Tajikistan to participate
in CARICC when it is eventually established in Almaty, as well
as to share information with other countries in the region. The
U.S.-funded country-wide Harris communication system will add
microwave capability for wireless encryption data transmission
to all regions of Tajikistan.
4. COMMENT: The joint U.S.-Russia ceremony was the
brainchild
of DCM Dushanbe and a result of the hard work of both DCMs. We
are pleased that Ambassador Abdulatipov agreed to participate in
such an event, the first time ever we have been able concretely
to show U.S.-Russian security cooperation in Tajikistan. If the
Russian media report this event, it will be a small dose of
antidote against the poison of «Great Game propaganda.» END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53615
date: 2/21/2006 5:41
refid: 06DUSHANBE321
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE199|06DUSHANBE321
header:
VZCZCXRO3057
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0321/01 0520541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 210541Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6721
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1381
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1422
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1417
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1362
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1305
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1384
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1336
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1281
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1467
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0755
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7836
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000321
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA/CEN, EUR (DAS BRYZA), E
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: NEW ECONOMIC ADVISER INTENDS TO ACCELERATE REFORM
REF: DUSHANBE 0199
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Newly appointed
Presidential Adviser on Economic Affairs
Matlubhon Davlatov characterized his appointment not as a change
in President Rahmonov’s economic reform agenda but as a means to
accelerate it. «I’m not new
to this team,» he told the
Ambassador during a February 17 initial meeting, explaining that
he has been part of the presidential economic team nearly from
the beginning, first as head of privatization (reftel), then
more recently as head of the Office of Financial Control
(somewhat like the U.S. OMB) in the Presidential Apparat. He
agreed with the Ambassador’s suggestion that his goal in his new
job is to accelerate economic reform.
He laughed at recent
media reports claiming he is widely disliked for his
knock-their-heads-together reputation as a get-it-done
bureaucrat.
2. (C) COMMENT: Davlatov’s predecessor, Faizullo Khoboboyev,
was increasingly seen by the international community as a
charming but increasing roadblock, rather than facilitator, for
economic reform, and was generally accused of single-handedly
stalemating resolution of the critical farm-debt problem. In
fact, he himself did not have that kind of power, but was likely
simply representing special interests.
The Presidential Apparat
is currently well aware that the World Bank is about to come
down hard on Tajikistan for the farm-debt problem. END COMMENT.
3. (C) Davlatov praised
U.S.-Tajik relations, and noted the
profound economic impact that would come from completing the
U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanzh.
The «Road of Life,» as he
called it, will greatly increase trade opportunities for both
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and play an important role in
building prosperity in the region, he said. Hearing of the
recent cement supply problems for the construction site, he made
a note and said firmly, «That will be resolved.» (COMMENT:
It
won’t be that easy, but his backing will help. END COMMENT.)
4. (C) Davlatov made a brief
pitch for bilateral debt
forgiveness, which would provide Tajikistan more room to
implement economic reform. He
hoped «other countries» (i.e.,
the United States) would follow the IMF’s recent decision to
forgive $99 million. Davlatov
highlighted developments in
hydropower as another important prospect for Tajikistan, and
welcomed U.S. involvement in this sector.
5. (C) Davlatov hewed to current
government talking points —
«Thanks for the humanitarian aid, but we are ready for economic
assistance,» meaning direct foreign investment. He noted
information on USAID assistance in a comprehensive Tajik
government publication was out of date, and asked for more
current and detailed data about U.S. support. (COMMENT:
USAID
has regularly provided the Tajik government broad-brush
information on its sectoral involvement, but is reluctant to
provide detailed statistical information because the government
wants to use it to crosscheck the bottom-line assistance U.S.
NGOs report. Our State Department
position is that it is better
to be transparent, especially because we advocate transparency
for Tajikistan. END COMMENT.)
6. (C) Davlatov noted that the
coming months would be extremely
busy for the Tajik government, including the ceremonial opening
DUSHANBE 00000321 002 OF 002
of the Anzob Tunnel and concurrent visit by Iran’s President
Ahmedinejad. Especially
important, President Rahmonov’s annual
April speech to Parliament will announce a recommitment to
economic reform and growth, and it is already being drafted
under Davlatov’s supervision.
7. (C) Davlatov confirmed he will
travel to Washington in April
for the annual World Bank/IMF meetings, and welcomed the
Ambassador’s offer to set up political side meetings for him
(septel).
8. (C) COMMENT AND BIO data: Davlatov made a positive first
impression. Probably in his early
50s, he is polite, slim,
well-tailored, and precisely well-spoken, although he is clearly
a no-nonsense kind of guy that you probably would not want to
cross. He has a Russian PhD in
economics, was of course a
«Komsomol boy,» and has been involved in economic affairs his
entire career. We know he is a
close relative of President
Rahmonov, but whether uncle or cousin we have not yet been able
to pin down. The closest we have
gotten is that growing up the
two «shared a garden wall» in Dangara. It is broadly assumed
Davlatov is extremely wealthy, having made his first fortune
when he oversaw the first phases of Tajikistan’s post-Soviet
privatization. After a few too
many vodka toasts at a
government banquet last year, he reportedly threw his arm around
then-Aga Khan Director Hakim Feerasta’s shoulder and slurred
magnanimously, «Why haven’t you built your Serena Hotel yet? If
you need money, I’ll give it to you personally.»
9. (C) COMMENT AND BIO DATA
CONTINUED: Davlatov told us with a
fair amount of pride he has been to the United States six times,
the first in the 1980s when he was part of a Soviet economic
delegation. In 1995, he spent two
weeks in Kansas City at an
economic reform seminar. Davlatov
clearly understands English
fairly well, but is reluctant to use it, except for a few polite
phrases. During the meeting, a
telephone rang, and Davlatov
abruptly jumped up to answer it.
His notetaker, a young woman
from the banking sector, mouthed to us, «the President.» When
Davlatov returned to the table, he explained that he is obliged
to answer when the «special direct line» rings. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53616
date: 2/21/2006 5:51
refid: 06DUSHANBE322
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3067
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0322/01 0520551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 210551Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6723
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0961
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1469
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7838
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000322
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, E, SA/CEN, EUR (DAS BRYZA), DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KEY VISITORS FROM
DUSHANBE
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) During an interagency
meeting in Washington in January
to elaborate the Tajikistan section of the policy document, «A
Strategy for Central Asia,» the Ambassador undertook to
recommend names of key Tajik insiders who could be invited to
Washington for low-profile but high-level conversations about
economic reform and Tajikistan’s upcoming presidential election
in November 2006. A small core of
«young reformers» with
intimate ties to key officials who are also members of the First
Family would ensure that any message is immediately and, we are
quite certain, accurately communicated «to the very top.»
THE INNER-INNER CIRCLE
2. (C) Two family members are
essential: First Brother-in-Law
and Chairman of Orien Bank Hasan Sadulloyev, and the President’s
uncle (or cousin) Presidential Economic Adviser Matlubhon
Davlatov (septel). They both have
an unmediated direct and
constant line to President Rahmonov.
Also in this group, but
not a family member, and so once slightly removed, is Chairman
of the National Bank Muradali Alimardonov who has presided over
Tajikistan’s credible steps toward banking reform and who serves
as President Rahmonov’s major domo (and personal financier) for
major ceremonial events. Their
teenage sons are close buddies.
TWO KEY YOUNG REFORMERS IN THE INNER-INNER CIRCLE
3. (C) Two «young
reformers» are part of this inner circle
because they are Sadulloyev protigis — Chairman of the State
Savings Bank (with a Johns Hopkins PhD) Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov,
a soft-spoken but increasingly powerful Pamiri who in the one
year he has been in his current job has taken major steps (with
Presidential protection) to curb the massive corruption in the
State Pension System, and TadAZ Deputy Director (but the real
political power there) Sherali Kabirov, who has stopped the
hemorrhaging of TadAZ profits to secret and private off-shore
accounts and redirected them into the state budget. To round
out this group, as a supporting but essential actor, would be
Sadulloyev’s young Executive Assistant and personal English
translator Dalar Shukrov.
OTHERS DEEMED ESSENTIAL WHOM WE KNOW LESS WELL
4. (C) While researching this
initiative, two other names have
repeatedly come to our attention:
Chairman of the Presidential
Financial Control Committee (which Davlatov formerly headed)
Abdujobor Shirinov, and State Adviser for Personnel Abdujobor
Azizov. The latter is especially
powerful because he is the
gate-keeper for all senior personnel appointments around the
country and, thus, is totally trusted by the President.
MAYBE ONE MORE?
5. (C) Our best sources often
named Tajikistan’s newly
appointed PermRep to the United Nations Sirojiddin Aslov. In
our experience, his diffidence seemed to suggest he was a
relatively minor player, but on the other hand he is Dangaran,
possibly a Family Cousin, and always tried to be helpful to
Embassy Dushanbe when he was First Deputy Foreign Minister.
6. (C) Curiously, the name of
Tajikistan’s Ambassador to the
United States Hamrohon Zaripov did not come up. He has always
seemed to us to understand, at least in general, economic
reform, and seems to understand the ins and outs of Washington.
But he may possibly be seen as a little too ambitious to be a
fully trusted and vetted «ultimate insider.» Also, he’s not
Family.
FAMILY IS REALITY, AND WE CAN MAKE IT WORK FOR US
7. (C) That brings us to the
issue of Family. Although it’s
distasteful to us, and can be dangerously counter-productive
(e.g., the Shevardnadzes, Akayevs, and now Karimovs), it is
simply the post-Soviet reality in Tajikistan. We can distance
ourselves because of our principles, or we can work to co-opt
them. We strongly recommend the
latter course of action,
especially because this inner circle includes Western-oriented
DUSHANBE 00000322 002 OF 003
reformers like Mahmadaminov and, we believe, Kabirov.
APRIL WORLD BANK MEETINGS WOULD BE OPTIMAL
8. (C) The natural timing for
U.S. meetings with these key
insiders would be on the margins, or for a few days immediately
after, the annual World Bank and IMF meetings in Washington in
April. Alimardonov and Davlatov
will definitely attend. It
would be no stretch at all to ensure Mahmadaminov attends. If
he understood the purpose, Sadulloyev would willingly attend.
9. (C) It might take a bit of
work, but we are certain that we
could ensure TadAZ’s Kabirov also attends, if for no other
reason than he told us February 18 during a private bowling
party he has never been to the United States, but very much
wants to meet with leaders of the U.S. aluminum industry to
begin to build contacts to balance the predatory maneuverings of
RusAl’s Oleg Deripaska whom it increasingly seems Tajikistan
distrusts because of his high-profile sucking up to the Karimov
family in Uzbekistan. (NOTE: The Swiss-registered but U.S.
privately held company Glencor trades 70 percent of TadAZ’s
aluminum production, a 10 percent decrease from before because
Hyundai now has a piece of the action.
END NOTE.)
PRESENT THE INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE
10. (C) Any senior U.S.
Administration meetings with the core
group should have two separate messages.
The first would be
easy and very well-received, and would set a feel-good tone. We
would recommend a luncheon in the Secretary’s Dining Room during
which an approved version of the Secretary’s Greater Central
Asia Infrastructure Initiative would be presented, perhaps by
Under Secretary Shiner. (The
slides should be translated into
Russian, and hard copies should be presented to the Tajik
participants.) A brief drop-by by
the Secretary herself, even
for only five minutes, would be extremely well-received, and
demonstrate our serious commitment to the bilateral relationship
and to our respect for Tajikistan’s place in Greater Central
Asia.
THE POLITICAL MESSAGE:
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
11. (C) The second meeting should
be about the upcoming
Presidential election. We would
leave it to Washington to
determine the venue, but would suggest the Roosevelt Room in the
West Wing of the White House, because of the enormous power and
prestige of the U.S. Presidency.
We thoroughly understand the
constraints on his time, but a very brief, five-minute drop-by
by President Bush would most certainly underscore the message in
no uncertain terms and would be understood as a mark of
highest-level interest. An
alternative to the West Wing would
be a luncheon in Blair House.
12. (C) This would be the
slightly more difficult meeting, and
the message would need to be carefully calibrated and presented
with careful diplomatic gentility.
We would be glad to work
with Washington to elaborate the message, but the core elements
would include the following:
13. (C, RELEASABLE TO TI) Begin
proposed talking points:
— We recognize Tajikistan, an increasingly important partner
for Afghanistan, as a key state in Greater Central Asia.
— Since 2000, Tajikistan has made remarkable progress
recovering from the 1992-97 Civil War and getting the economy
growing again. As you have seen
from our Infrastructure
Initiative presentation, we are with you.
— Tajikistan generally has increasing respect in the
international community, in large part thanks to President
Rahmonov’s «open-door» foreign policy and relatively moderate
and progressive governance. We
want that respect to grow.
— We will not embarrass you by making demands we know your
government cannot fulfill.
Partners in a mature relationship do
not do that to each other.
— But as a friend of Tajikistan, we do want to make several
recommendations that we believe will benefit Tajikistan
internally, that will actually improve longer-term stability,
and that will further improve your government’s international
DUSHANBE 00000322 003 OF 003
image.
— We will be frank and tell you we understand that President
Rahmonov will win the November election, in part because he is
truly respected for having established stability in the country
following your tragic civil war.
— We know President Rahmonov understands that events in
Georgia, Ukraine, and even Kyrgyzstan occurred in recent years
in part because of chronically weak economies and endemic
corruption at the top levels of society.
— We have noted with admiration President Rahmonov’s attempts
to build Tajikistan’s economy and to rein in corruption, and we
understand he is doing this in a most complex arena with
competing interests.
— Because President Rahmonov will win the November election, as
friends of Tajikistan we want to recommend strongly that the
election be conducted so that it meets international standards.
President Rahmonov is strong enough that he can now afford this
«luxury.» If he does
so, it would enormously increase his
international prestige.
— The steps we recommend would include equal and fair radio and
TV broadcast time for all political parties, no matter how weak
or strong they may be; provision for Tajik civil society
organizations to serve as poll monitors; and — most important —
absolute transparency in reporting accurate and honest vote
tallies [known in Tajikistan as «protocols»] at the local and,
especially, district levels.
— We ask that President Rahmonov make clear in public, long
before the actual date of the election, that he will not
tolerate local and district officials «over-fulfilling the
plan,» and that if they do so, they will face clear and certain
consequences.
End proposed talking points.
14. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe looks
forward to working closely
with Washington on this initiative.
Please advise our next
steps.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53653
date: 2/21/2006 11:46
refid: 06DUSHANBE326
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05DUSHANBE2013|05DUSHANBE2094|06DUSHANBE63|06DUSHANBE90
header:
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PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0326/01 0521146
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6728
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0964
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0757
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1183
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0016
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7843
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000326
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, ENRG, ECON, PREL, TI, AF
SUBJECT: HYDROPOWER 101: A GUIDE TO TAJIKISTAN’S PROSPECTS, PROJECTS,
AND PLAYERS
REF: A) DUSHANBE 63; B) DUSHANBE
90; C) 05 DUSHANBE 2094; D) 05 DUSHANBE 2013
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
The Prospects:
1. (U) Tajikistan’s mountains and
rivers provide it an
estimated four percent of the world’s hydropower resources. The
Tajik government has no shortage of promises and offers to help
develop this natural resource, and is currently balancing
competing interests and priorities to maximize the financial
benefits hydropower will bring to Tajikistan (and its elites).
2. (U) Tajikistan’s energy
industry is currently mismanaged and
outdated. Power outages are the
norm; urban areas in winter
frequently only have limited hours of electricity a day and
rural areas can be completely without power, despite the
existence of Soviet-era lines.
Meanwhile, consumption and
demand continue to rise.
3. (U) In addition to meeting
domestic energy needs, the Tajik
government sees the potential to export electricity south to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, connecting to the new Afghan grid
slated for construction. An
excess of electricity already
exists in the summer months that could be exported with the
right transmission lines bypassing the Uzbek grid. The Tajik
electric company’s chief engineer reported that in 2005
Tajikistan wasted 1.2 billion kW hours because Uzbekistan would
not agree to allow transit through its transmission lines.
4. (C) Tajikistan does not see
itself immediately exporting
electricity to Russian or China, despite recent investment from
both countries in its hydroenergy sector.
The Projects:
5. (C) Potential Hydropower Stations (HPS)
— Sangtuda I: A 670 MW/2.7 billion kilowatt per hour (kWh)
project to be built by RAO UES, Russia’s electricity monopoly
with significant funding from the Russian state budget. RAO UES
wants the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to have
partial equity, but the IFIs want the electricity to be
exported. President Rahmonov has
said Sangtuda must be used to
meet domestic energy needs, but allowed that electricity might
be exported in the summer. Price:
$550 million. Time:
Construction started in 2005, slated to come on line by 2008.
— Sangtuda II: A 220 MW/0.9
billion kWh project constructed
and financed by the Iranians, who will own the plant for 12.5
years, after which it will revert to Tajikistan. Also to be
used for domestic energy needs.
Price: $200 million. Time: The
groundbreaking was February 20, scheduled to come on line by
2010.
— Rogun: A 3600 MW/13.1 billion kWh HPS on the Vash
river and
the big fish in Tajikistan’s hydro pond.
The Tajik government
has pushed Rogun as the crown jewel in its hydropower scheme,
and Russian Aluminum (RusAl) has already committed to at least
two of the six turbines. RusAl
has stated that Rogun energy
should be directed towards aluminum production. Uzbek President
Karimov has come out strongly against the Rogun project, citing
environmental concerns, and RusAl has been in close consultation
with the Uzbek government over Rogun.
Tajikistan has said it
wants an international consortium to build Rogun because it is
unsure of RusAl’s commitment to the project.
The German consulting firm Lahmeyer is currently conducting a
DUSHANBE 00000326 002 OF 004
feasibility study of Rogun, to be completed in Summer 2006. A
key issue is the type of dam:
RusAl may be pushing for a
concrete dam for Rogun because a Russian research and
development institute has readily-available technical
specifications for such a dam.
According to Deputy Energy
Minister Souliemanov, the Tajik government would prefer to build
a rock-filled dam; the expense of a concrete dam will cost
Tajikistan much of its equity in the project.
AES, a U.S. company eager to enter the market, has also
expressed a willingness to partner with RusAl or RAO UES on
Rogun, but the Tajik government has frequently tried to steer
AES towards constructing the transmission lines, not the
generation plant. Price: $1.2
billion. Time: Around 4-5 years
to build, estimated to come on line June 2010.
— Shurob: 600 MW/3.0 billion kWh. This project was not on
any international radar screens until a January announcement
that the Chinese Development Bank intended to finance this
plant, 12 km south of the existing Nurek station. The Chinese
Trade Attachi indicated only Chinese firms will be eligible to
bid on the tender. Price:
unknown, although the Chinese
Development Bank gave a $90 million line of credit. A
feasibility study is underway now, no set construction date.
— Varzob Cascade: The United States Trade and Development
Agency (USTDA) has funded Eurasia link to conduct a $400,000
feasibility study for the rehabilitation of these three separate
power plants. However, Ministry
of Energy (MoE) sources
indicated the Chinese and other unnamed firms may also have
conducted feasibility studies on the same project.
— Kairrakum Hydroelectric
Rehabilitation Project: Part of the
USTDA-financed feasibility study, along with the Varzob Cascade.
Likely also a project of interest
to the Chinese.
— Golva HPS rehabilitation: a 240 MW HPS in need of
rehabilitation, according to the MoE.
Price and time frame
unknown.
— Dost-i-Zhum: 4000 MW HPS on
the Tajik-Afghan border.
Conceived as a project purely for export to Afghanistan and
beyond, this would be Tajikistan’s biggest HPS. President
Rahmonov touts it as a way to develop north Afghanistan and
eventually cut poppy cultivation.
Price: Estimated $3-4
billion. No projected start date
or financing.
6. (C) Transmission Lines:
— «Phase I»: 30 km of
220 kV transmission lines from
Dusti/Geran to the Afghan border at Sher Khan Bandar. AES has
expressed a willingness to build as a way to enter the market.
Could export existing excess energy in the summer. Estimated
price: $12-$30 million.
— South-North (Regar-Kuljent)
500 kV transmission lines: The
Chinese are already conducting a feasibility study for
high-voltage lines to connect power production in the south to
Northern Tajikistan, which currently depends on Uzbekistan for
much of its energy. Estimated commitment from China through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: $90 million.
— Lolazor-Hovaling transmission
lines and Lolazor substation:
70 km of 220 kV transmission lines in Kulyab region plus
rehabilitation of the substation.
Cost: $10 million.
7. (C) The Players:
— Deputy Prime Minister
Ghulomov: Very involved with
DUSHANBE 00000326 003 OF 004
hydropower and a key player at a January 16 meeting in Dushanbe
in which interested parties signed a protocol to establish the
International Hydropower Consortium.
— Minister of Energy Jurabek
Nurmamatov: Rumored to be close
friends with RAO UES chairman Chubais and seems favorably
disposed to U.S. involvement in hydro sector. Told Embassy,
«Without the United States, Rogun will not be built» (Reftel
C).
— Deputy Minister of Energy
Aleksey Silantev: Head of
Hydropower. Has told Embassy the
United States waits too long
on projects, while other companies and countries move faster.
«You only talk, but nothing concrete,» he said to PolOff
February 20.
— Deputy Minister of Energy
Akhram Suleimanov: Appointed by
Nurmamatov to oversee the USTDA feasibility study on Varzob and
Kairrakum. Suleimanov has
cautioned about the politics
surrounding the Rogun project and shared his off-the-record
concern with PolOff January 27 that RusAl was playing a game
with Tajikistan and may quietly pull out in the end.
— RusAl: Russian Aluminum,
headed by oligarch Oleg Deripaska,
has been pushing to develop Tajikistan’s hydro sector, but found
itself shut out of Sangtuda I and II.
RusAl signed the Jan 16
protocol committing itself as a «co-investor» in Rogun and to
carry out a feasibility study.
RusAl is actively looking for
investment partners for Rogun.
MoE sources say RusAl has
committed to two of Rogun’s six turbines
RusAl needs electricity to power and expand aluminum production
at the Tajik Aluminum Plant (Tawas), and has hinted at building
a second aluminum smelter near the President’s hometown of
Dungara. RusAl objects to
exporting Tajik electricity unless
the electricity needed for aluminum production is met. RusAl
has recently been in close touch with Uzbek President Karimov
and especially First Daughter Gulnora.
It is rumored Deripaska
promised Karimov he would be consulted before RusAl committed to
Rogun.
— RAO UES: Russian conglomerate developing Sangtuda
I. At
one point indicated interest in partnering with AES, but has
since declined. In the January 16
protocol, only agreed it was
«ready to consider attraction of credit resources from IFIs»
but
has secured financial backing from Russian government for
Sangtuda I.
— China: China has moved quietly into the hydropower
game,
conducting a feasibility study on the Shurob HPS, and possibly
on the Varzob Cascade and the South-North (Regar) Transmission
lines. Chinese representatives
attended the January 16
Consortium meeting, but declined to sign the protocol.
— AES: U.S. firm with significant experience in
Kazakhstan
and Pakistan. The Tajik
government repeatedly assures AES
leadership there is a role for them in developing hydropower,
but has pushed for AES to build transmission lines. AES is
willing to build the lines, particularly Phase I, but also
insists it must have equity in a generation facility for those
lines. After being shut out of
Sangtuda I and II, AES hopes
Rogun could be its primary project.
It has indicated interest
in partnering with RAO UES or RusAl on Rogun, or the Chinese on
a smaller HPS project.
— Asian Development Bank
(ADB): Active in Tajikistan’s energy
and infrastructure sector since 1998, ADB approved a $21 million
loan to the Tajik government for reforms in the energy sector.
In late 2000, ADB approved a $34 million loan to improve
DUSHANBE 00000326 004 OF 004
electricity supply to poor and war-damaged Khatlon region and
the city of Dushanbe.
— Central Asian Regional
Economic Cooperation (CAREC): An ADB
initiative to encourage economic cooperation and coordination,
it focuses on transport, energy and trade. CAREC’s energy
initiatives in Tajikistan are starting to gain speed, as way to
link the region.
— European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
currently does not have projects in the energy sector but is
considering financing for rehabilitation of the Varzob Cascade
HPS, according to Eurasialink.
— World Bank: The World Bank’s Washington representatives
drive its hydropower policy for Tajikistan. The World Bank
wants Tajikistan to develop its hydropower for export to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, putting it at odds with President
Rahmonov, who has publicly said he has must help meet domestic
needs. The World Bank may help
the Iranians finance Sangtuda
II, or Rogun.
ARMBRUSTER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53656
date: 2/21/2006 11:54
refid: 06DUSHANBE327
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
05DUSHANBE2013|05DUSHANBE2094|06DUSHANBE326|06DUSHANBE63|06DUSHANBE90
header:
VZCZCXRO3479
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0327/01 0521154
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211154Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6732
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1428
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1387
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1342
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1311
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1368
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0968
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0761
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1187
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0020
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7847
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000327
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, ENRG, ECON, PREL, TI, AF
SUBJECT: TAJIK HYDROPOWER 201:
ADVANCED GAME THEORY
REF: A) DUSHANBE 326; B) DUSHANBE
63; C) DUSHANBE 90; D) 05 DUSHANBE 2094; E)
05 DUSHANBE 2013
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) In Tajik hydropower, a new
conventional wisdom is
emerging. If we want the Central
Asian Infrastructure
Initiative to succeed in Tajikistan, we need to consider the
following:
2. (C) The United States is
behind the curve on hydropower.
Russia is building Sangtuda I and has first grabs on Rogun
(Reftel A). Iran broke ground for
Sangtuda II February 20. The
Chinese have been in quiet but serious negotiations to build a
hydropower station (HPS) and high-voltage transmission lines
(Reftel B). The U.S. firm AES has
been gently pushed out of
Sangtuda, and possibly Rogun, and is scrambling to find a
generation project. The United
States has funded some
feasibility studies, but they were slow to get off the ground
and may already be overtaken by events.
Deputy Energy Minister
Silantev and others have indicated that the Chinese have
completed a feasibility of the same Varzob Cascade and Kairrakum
HPS project the USTDA has given $400,000 to Eurasialink to
evaluate. Silantev on several
occasions has told PolOff, «You
Americans talk, but so far, nothing concrete.»
3. (C) The Tajiks do not
understand how U.S. investment works.
Other countries -Russia, Iran, China — offer direct government
investment as a carrot and can tell their companies what to do.
The Embassy is frequently asked how much the U.S. government
will support or guarantee AES’s bids for Rogun or power lines.
Because a private U.S. firm like AES will only invest when the
conditions are right and IFI financing is independently secured,
the United States is seen as overly cautious or slow. The fact
that we are building a $27 million bridge at Nizhniy Pyanzh
further confuses claims that the U.S. government does not
directly invest in infrastructure projects. On the other hand,
the Russian parliament earmarked millions for RAO UES to build
Sangtuda, and the Iranians promised $180 million for Sangtuda
II.
4. (C) The Tajiks do not take the
U.S. seriously in hydropower.
Others in the government energy
sector have echoed Silantev’s
comments that Americans talk about investments, but have failed
to invest, or even come close to negotiations. Other countries
have sent cabinet-level ministers to engage the Tajiks directly
on economic issues and show their serious intent. The
Tajik-Iranian presidential meeting in Tehran January 16-17
focused almost exclusively on economic issues, including the
deal for Sangtuda II. The Tajik,
Iranian and Afghan energy
ministers met in Dushanbe February 20.
Tajikistan sees U.S.
efforts going into Afghanistan-including debt relief-and could
draw the conclusion that the U.S. has bigger obligations and
interests.
5. (C) The Tajiks are open to
whomever comes with funding
first. Nowhere is President
Rahmonov’s «open door» foreign
policy more evident than in economic development. As Foreign
Minister Nazarov told the Ambassador, «All money smells the
same.» Several Deputy Energy
Ministers have marveled at how
swiftly the Chinese dove into several projects, guaranteeing
their investments. Despite
skepticism about U.S. intent in
hydropower, key power players continue to welcome U.S.
companies. Deputy Prime Minister
Ghulomov told the DCM he hoped
AES would have a role in future projects, particularly
transmission lines. Energy
Minister Nurmamatov said simply,
«Without the U.S., Rogun will not be built» (Reftel D).
6. (C) The United States still
has an opportunity to play a
role in Tajik hydropower, but we run the risk of being
DUSHANBE 00000327 002 OF 002
marginalized by more determined and decisive regional-power
investors. The USTDA regional
conference in Istanbul in June
could be an excellent opportunity to reengage the Tajiks, but it
may be a hard sell to convince them that it is not an auction to
sell cows that have already left the barn. Some of the most
significant Tajik power projects will have already been claimed
by others by the time the U.S. investors and businesses meet in
Istanbul to «talk» some more.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53679
date: 2/21/2006 14:12
refid: 06DUSHANBE328
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3671
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0328/01 0521412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 211412Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6734
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1389
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1430
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1419
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1370
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1313
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1386
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1344
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1283
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1189
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0970
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1437
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1472
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0763
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7849
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000328
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, G, USDAFS
TASHKENT FOR ESTH
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EIND, SENV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NATIONAL PARKS SEEK U.S. COOPERATION
DUSHANBE 00000328 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY: Central Asian Regional Environment, Science,
Technology and Health Officer (REO), and Environmental
Specialist and Embassy PolOff, visited the Tigrovaya Balka
National Reserve February 8.
Officials from State Committee on
Environmental Protection (SCEP) accompanied EmbOffs. The
government has made some efforts to improve the park system and
recognizes tourism as an alternative means to diversify the
economy, however the government lacks the money and specialized
skills needed to upgrade the parks.
END SUMMARY.
2. Tajikistan’s 17 natural
reserves and parks are good
prospects for eco-tourism or extreme-tourism, and could
potentially generate significant public and private income.
Already Marco Polo sheep, the Pamir Mountains, and Tajikistan’s
pristine environment, untrampled by Western tourists, draw some
100 hunters, hikers, and adventurous backpackers who are willing
to pay thousands of dollars to travel to Tajikistan. SCEP
officials are interested in working with the United States
government, especially the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Forest Service (USDAFS), and have begun
discussions to improve park management.
Tajikistan is also
reaching out to its neighbors, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan
to establish a Peace Park in the Pamirs.
3. Tigrovaya Balka National
Reserve is located in southern
Tajikistan and borders Aghanistan.
During the Tajik civil war,
Russian and Tajik Government forces were stationed in the
reserve and refugees from Tajikistan and Afghanistan often
transited through and hunted in the park, destroying its
resources. Tajik Border Guards
now patrol the reserve’s
southern border, and SCEP officials assured EmbOffs that drug
smugglers and terrorists no longer transit the reserve.
Approximately 30 park employees supervise the nearly
50,000-hectare reserve.
4. The SCEP recognized that money
will help rebuild the park
system, but they also realize that they need assistance from
tourism, ecology, and park specialists.
SCEP officials
explained that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, like other
fields, specialists left the country, and Tajikistan’s current
education system no longer can supply the scientific and
technical specialists needed to manage the parks The SCEP
realizes new laws need to be added to promote eco-tourism and
proper park management and is working with the Parliament on a
draft law revising Soviet-era environmental protection laws.
5. One of the problems afflicting
the Tigrovaya Balka Nature
Reserve, as well as most of Central Asia is salinization. A
white layer of salt coats a large part of the reserve.
Salinization is a common problem throughout Tajikistan and must
be carefully managed to protect native salt-tolerant species.
Agricultural practices in most of Central Asia result in the
kind of salt layers seen in Tigrovaya Balka.
6. Most of Tigrovaya Balka’s
facilities were destroyed during
the civil war, and since then, the government has been able to
do little financially to help the park.
However, SCEP officials
assured EmbOffs that the government is beginning to fund
environmental projects and has earmarked 600,000 somoni
(approximately $187,000) over four years for improvements in the
park system. In addition,
international donors are also
assisting in some park improvements.
Last year, the park
received enough government financing to build a museum at its
entrance and renovate some rest areas and buildings throughout
the reserve.
7. COMMENT: SCEP officials seemed progressive and
understand
the need to modernize laws in order to improve the system.
However, in many ways, they are still rooted in the Soviet-era
DUSHANBE 00000328 002.2 OF 002
approach to park and land management.
Tajikistan’s nature parks
and tourism industry would benefit greatly from cooperation with
the U.S. National Park Service, Forest Service, Fish and
Wildlife Service, and other U.S. government agencies active in
park and forest management, environmental protection, and
tourism. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 53685
date: 2/21/2006 14:34
refid: 06DUSHANBE329
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 05DUSHANBE1737|06DUSHANBE329
header:
VZCZCXRO3704
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0329/01 0521434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 211434Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6736
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1391
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1432
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1421
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1372
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1315
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1388
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1346
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1285
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1191
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0972
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1439
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1474
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0765
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7851
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000329
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: DUSHANBE CITY GOVERNMENT FINALLY ACTS AND DEMOLISHES HALF OF
ONLY REMAINING SYNAGOGUE
REF: 05 DUSHANBE 1737
DUSHANBE 00000329 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
City authorities tore down half of
Dushanbe’s synagogue February 8 along with several private homes
remaining in the largely cleared vicinity to build a road
leading to the new Presidential Palace.
The synagogue has known
about this planned demolition for at least three years, but has
been unable to stop it and unwilling to consider relocation
(REFTEL). The synagogue’s Rabbi,
Mikhail Abdurahmonov, is
seeking legal assistance to try
post facto to reach an
agreement with the government for fair compensation. We
expect the story will soon go international. Anti-Semitism is
not involved. The saddest part of
this long-brewing story is
that various international communities have not been willing to
be pro-active on this issue to help the small remnant Jewish
community in Dushanbe. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) A Jewish-American citizen, who has taken
interest in
assisting the synagogue met with PolOff February 21 to update
the Embassy on recent developments.
According to him,
Government authorities advised the synagogue on February 7 they
would begin demolition. Rabbi
Mikhail Abdurahmonov staved off
the demolition and asked the authorities to talk to city
officials and the mayor, whom he claimed promised him they would
not tear down the synagogue.
(COMMENT: In fact, to the best of
our knowledge, the mayor never made this promise, although he
did promise to relocate the synagogue and community center. For
various reasons, the rabbi never accepted this offer, and
insisted the synagogue would never move.
END COMMENT.)
Officials could not get anyone in the government to authorize a
construction halt and proc
